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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Appellants believe that Phase I presents simply an 
issue of whether the trial court*s conclusion as to the 
priority of liens on real property was supported by its own 
findings or by the evidence. 
Issues presented in Phase II are whether the trial 
court granted the appropriate remedy, whether its limited award 
of damages is supported by the evidence, and whether it abused 
its discretion in failing to award punitive damages and 
adequate attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Plaintiffs brought action to determine priority of 
lien interests on real property which had been their home until 
they sold it in October, 1980, and for fraud involved in a loan 
rewrite and subordination agreement pertaining to those 
interests in the same property in late 1981 after the buyer 
became delinquent in payment. 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
Plaintiffs (hereinafter Perkins) initially filed their 
complaint against Dick E. Coombs, (hereinafter Coombs), Coombs 
Investment Corporation, (hereinafter CIC) and Interlake Thrift 
on July 26, 1982. (R. 2) Interlake cross-claimed against 
Coombs and brought a third-party complaint against Guarantee 
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Title Company (hereinafter Guaranty), Southern Title Guarantee 
Company, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, Mark J. 
Williams and Ruth R. Coombs. Coombs and CIC brought a 
third-party complaint against Monson & Company, Peter R. Lucero 
and Jesse Monson. The third-party actions against Monson & 
Co., Lucero, and Monson were subsequently dismissed pursuant to 
motion and stipulation. (R 326, 408-409). Interlake1s claim 
against Williams was dismissed after Phase I of the trial (R. 
680). Actions by and against Coombs and Ruth Coombs were 
stayed by their bankruptcy filings (R. 640-641). 
Phase I judgment, tried in 1983, entered December 11, 
1984, gave all parties judgment on their claims against CIC, 
and Interlake was found to have priority over Perkins after the 
sale of October 31, 1980. 
Phase II judgment, tried in 1984, entered November 19, 
1984, gave Perkins judgment against Interlake for fraud, and 
the trial court certified the judgments between Perkins and 
Interlake for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 821-824), even though proceedings 
against Dick and Ruth Coombs were stayed due to their having 
taken bankruptcy in Las Vegas, Nevada. The trial court gave 
Interlake judgment against the underwriter. Southern Guaranty 
Title Company, which chose to pay and satisfy the judgment and 
is not a party to this appeal. 
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Perkins brought Motion to Amend Judgment, filed 
December 21, 1984 (R. 874-876), which was denied by Order 
entered March 19, 1985. (R. 949-950). 
Perkins filed their Notice of Appeal on April 16, 
1985. (R. 952-954). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was tried in two phases. Phase I involved 
sale of the Perkins1 home in 1980, and Phase II involved its 
subordination in 1981. The court's non-jury findings for Phase 
I are annexed as Addendum 1 and Phase II as Addendum 2. 
Perkins contend that the evidence justified findings 
of fact in addition to those made by the trial court. 
Perkins believe that they are entitled to the relief 
they seek based on the existing trial court's Findings of Fact, 
but that even so, particularly in the area of balancing of 
equities, an interpretation of the facts will be helpful. 
The line between interpretation of facts and argument 
of facts is thin, so Perkins will refer essentially to 
testimony of Interlake, to its documents, and to the testimony 
of Paul Scott, the real estate agent for Coombs and CIC. 
Perkins will draw from these factual conclusions they deem 
logical and compelling. 
In 1980, plaintiffs-appellants, George and Lillie 
Perkins, decided to move from their home at 54 South Jeremy 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. They had fee simple title to the 
nome and it was fully paid for. 
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They sold their home to Coombs Investment Corporation 
(CIC). This was a corporation formed and run by Dick E. Coombs 
(Coombs) who was licensed as a real estate salesman (R. 1050, 
L. 18-20). 
Mr. Coombs had figured, accurately, how to make money 
when buying a home rather than paying money. Mr. Coombs1 wife, 
Ruth, was owner and broker for a real estate company, ERA New 
World Realty. Mr. Coombs would prepare his standard purchase 
offer on listings, give these each day to a 20-year-old 
salesman working for his wife, Paul Scott, (R. 1224, Lol3-21), 
and Mr. Scott would then give a presentation to the owner using 
a memorized speech taught him by Mr. Coombs. Mr. Scott 
described these as being: 
'
fQ. Did you have any say in the language that was 
placed in the document? (Earnest Money) 
A. No. 
Q. You immediately presented it for ERA New World 
Realty? 
A. He (Dick Coombs) had a presentation you memorize, 
basically like a Mormon missionary would memorize his 
presentation that he would give to a prospect. Thatfs 
what I did, I gave the rote description. I would say 
I presented maybe a hundred of these offers 
altogether, or more. And they are all just a rote.1' 
(R. 1245, L. 4-14). 
Mr. Scott attended at least 15 closings on purchases 
he made for Mr. Coombs. (R., 1270, L. 24-1271, L. 9) 
The Perkins1 home shows how Mr. Coombs could make 
money while purchasing property. He borrowed more money than 
-4-
he needed for the downpayment to them, giving him a net, after 
costs and downpayment, of $4,578. (R. 1061 L. 9-1062 L. 25). 
His wife's real estate agency also received $2,200 as a 
commission on the Perkins' sale. (R. 1243 L. 3-19). In 
addition, while he held the property, he rented it out. 
Mr. Coombs contacted Interlake Thrift to borrow the 
downpayment. 
The earnest money (Exhibit 1; Addendum 3) provided CIC 
was to pay $13,000 down, and give a note and trust deed back to 
the Perkins for $24,000, on a total purchase price of $37,000. 
•Interlake obtained an appraisal showing the property 
to be worth $39,700 (Ex. 3), and a title report indicating the 
Perkins were clear owners (Ex. 11). Nevertheless, Interlake 
made no effort to review the earnest money to see if its loan 
terms conformed with those authorized by the Perkins (R. 1023, 
L. 2-5), which is customary lender practice (R. 1140, L. 21-R. 
1141, L. 25), made no effort to have Perkins sign a 
subordination agreement to Interlake's lien (R. 1023, L. 
12-15), made no effort to have any kind of contact at all with 
the Perkins (R. 1027, L. 4-6), yet nevertheless approved a loan 
to CIC of $20,756.44 at 18% per annum. (Ex. 6). Perkins, in 
fact, in the earnest money (Addendum 3), authorized CIC to 
borrow $17,000 at 14% (the $4,000 over the $13,000 downpayment 
to be used for "refurbishing"). 
Judge Fishier correctly found the Interlake loan to be 
at variance from the authorization given by Perkins (Addendum 
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1, paragraph 12)- Interlake1s itemization of its loan to CIC 
is annexed as Addendum 4- It is titled "Statement of Loan." 
The Statement of Loan is an interesting document. On 
its face, Coombs agrees to pay Interlake 18% interest on a loan 
of $20,756,44. However, it is a loan at 24%. 
In the portion of the form marked, "Disbursement of 
Amount Financed," there is an entry for $3,451.40 to "Interlake 
Thrift and Coombs Investment*" This money never left 
Interlake's office. Mr. Coombs signed the check and returned 
it on the spot to Interlake so that money was not actually 
loaned. (R. 1027, L. 7-R. 1029, L.7) This made the document's 
interest amount appear to be 6% smaller than it actually was. 
A major advantage to Interlake in appearing to loan 
$20,756.44, when it actually loaned $17,305.04, is that it drew 
interest, and could charge penalties and fees, on a principal 
sum $3,451.40 higher than it actually paid out. 
"Points" are frequently charged by lending 
institutions in real estate loans. The 24% can also be 
considered as "points." 
Testimony on this subject was given by Ronald Adams, 
vice president of Interlake (R. 1021, L. 1-15), who was also a 
licensed real estate salesman (R. 1051, L. 23-1052, L. 3). He 
handled all the transactions with Coombs and CIC. His 
testimony is as follows: 
"Q. (Mr. King) All right. The actual loan to CIC 
was at 24% interest? 
A. (Mr. Adams) That would have been the return. 
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Q. All right. And you, in response to Mr. Hunt's 
questions said that part of this, $3,541 was points; 
is that right? 
A. Yes. That's correct. 
Q. Now, points are sometimes charged by a financing 
institution, a lender, to increase the amount of 
return they receive on a loan; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And one point, two points, three points, they are 
the range of points that we customarily see do we not? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You charged 20 points, didn't you? 
A. It was 20 points per year for the term of the loan. 
Q. That's 20 points? 
A. Y e s . 
(R. 1049 L. 13-JL050 L. 6) 
Whether considered as 20 points,or as 24% interest, 
either was a bonanza for Interlake as profit on the 
transaction. 
An illumination of the relative profit from this CIC 
loan is that Interlake's computer was programed to handle all 
anticipated loans and interest rates. The smaller the loan the 
larger the interest 3% per month on loans up to $300, down to 
18% per annum on balances over $1,000. (70B-3-508[2], UCA). 
The interest rate and principal amount were both so 
high on the CIC loan, that the computer's programming couldn't 
handle them, and the entries had to be made manually. (R. 
1384, L. 7-23). 
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The testimony of Paul Scott, Mr* Coombs1 real estate 
representative, was that he was familiar with the market at 
that time in 1980, and that the interest rates on first 
mortgages, such as Coombs was attempting to obtain, were at 12% 
to 15% per annum, and that at 14% or 15%, no points were being 
charged. (R. 1252 L. 15-23; R. 1266, L. 19-1267 L. 4-) 
In fact, as Mr. Adams agreed, the 24% interest rate 
would have been illegal had it been a personal loan, but as Mr. 
Coombs dealt through his corporation as borrower, the consumer 
interest rate statutes did not apply. (R. 1030 L. 25-1031 L. 
6). 
Interlake was unwilling to make the loan unless it had 
a first priority on the home as against the Perkins. This need 
for security was particularly strong because at the time, 
October, 1980, Coombs had a delinquent personal loan with 
Interlake (R. 1048, L. 8-1049, L. 5). 
Mr. Adams made no effort to check the CIC financial 
statement, testifying that he viewed Mr. Coombs as being CIC. 
(R. 1031 L. 8-1032 L. 21). 
Analyze Coombs* interest, as an experienced banker 
would, and an even more compelling reason for Interlake to have 
ironclad security becomes apparent. The banker, as he 
considers the loan application, has to consider why a realtor 
buying realty offers such terms. If Mr. Coombs had an intent 
of repaying his loans, he would have obtained ordinary market 
terms so that he would have profits and be competitive. 
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At 20 points, or 24% interest, he couldn't be. What he could 
do, as he and his wife made $6,778 cash off the Perkins deal 
alone, is take his profits, get his rentals, run out the 
string, and then dump the project. This is what he did. 
Whether the above is accurate or speculation is 
immaterial because lines of thought like this would cross the 
mind of the lender, and it would take steps to protect itself 
against the possibility. If a person offers large profits, it 
is good business to accept them, but with that a strong 
security position is needed if the project is questionable. 
At that time, Interlake had the following information: 
1. It knew Perkins were fee owners of the property and 
in possession (Ex. 11; R. 1331, L. 8-11). 
2. It knew the Perkins1 property at 54 South Jeremy 
Street was free of any mortgages or encumbrances. (Ex. 11). 
3. It knew Coombs was borrowing the money to buy the 
Perkins1 property. (R. 1022 L. 22 - 1023 L. 1) 
4. It knew that Coombs, borrowing $17,305.04 from it, 
was borrowing $22,394.96 less than the appraised value of 
$39,700 (R. 1021 L. 21 - 1022 L. 3), so it had to consider 
whether Perkins were retaining an equity interest for the 
balance of the purchase price. 
5. Interlake assumed Coombs had an earnest money from 
the Perkins to purchase the property. (R. 1022 L. 22 - 1023 L. 
5). 
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6. Interlake knew that Coombs was a realtor (R. 1050, 
L. 18-20), offering to pay 24% for a real estate loan that was 
available in the market at 12% to 15% or, computing the 
"points", as Mr. Adams did, that Coombs was willing to pay 20 
points when 1, 2 or 3 points were customary on 12% loans, and 
no points were paid on loans at 14% to 15% per annum. 
7. Interlake could reasonably be assumed to know that 
almost no sellers would be willing to have their home equity 
subject to a prior loan drawing 24% interest when far less 
expensive loans were standard. 
It seems fairly patent that Interlake felt it could 
not contact the Perkins and ask them to subordinate their 
$24,000 remaining equity in the home to Interlake1s loan of 
$20,756.44. In addition to the long-term growth effects of the 
24% interest accumulating, the immediate effect was that 
deducting the Interlake loan at face value of $20,756.44 from 
the sale price left a balance in the property of $16,243.56, 
$7,756.44 less than the security the property gave Perkins if 
they did not subordinate to Interlake. 
At the same time, the loan was so appealing that 
Interlake wanted to close, but in a first priority position, if 
it could. The question was how to do it. 
THE FAIL SAFE POSITION 
Guarantee Title Company, a small title company which 
went out of business before this case came to trial, was 
selected to handle the closing. Interlake wrote a letter of 
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closing instructions to Guarantee Title dated October 30, 1980, 
(Ex. 2; Annexed as Addendum 5), which stated in part: 
"Pay to Coombs Investment all remaining 
monies when Interlake Thrift is in a first 
mortgage position on this property wested 
Lsic] under Coombs Investment Corp. with no 
other tax liens or any other liens ahead of 
Interlake Thrift." 
This letter makes it clear, incidentally, that 
Interlake knew that all of the money it was loaning was not 
going to apply to the property, because of its statement that 
after the Perkins received their downpayment, "Pay to Coombs 
Investment all remaining monies ... ." 
The primary significance of this letter of 
instructions is that the title company was directed that it 
could only disburse the loan proceeds after it gave Interlake a 
first priority position over the Perkins. 
This was the fail-safe position. If a title company 
fails to follow the instructions from the lender, the title 
company is liable to it. Accordingly, if the loan went through 
and there weren't difficulties, Interlake would have priority 
ahead of Perkins and make its profits. If the loan did not go 
through, no money was lost as there would be no disbursement, 
and if there were later difficulties, Interlake would have 
recourse against Guarantee Title. Either way, Interlake would 
be protected. 
The closing was scheduled for October 31, 1980. 
Interlake signed its loan papers two days earlier with 
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CIC on October 29, and submitted its trust deed and letter of 
instructions on October 30, 1980 to Guarantee Title. 
Interlake did not send any papers to the Perkins, 
their agent Mr. Lucero, Coombs1 agent, Mr, Scott, nor to 
Guarantee Title showing the actual terms of its loan. It 
withheld the statement of loan (Addendum 4) and the trust deed 
note to it from CIC (Ex. 6; R. 1024, L. 6-14). 
Guarantee's closing officer, Mr. Williams, testified 
that he did not know that CIC's loan with Interlake was at 
different terms than those authorized by the Perkins in the 
earnest money. (R. 1056 L. 22 - 1058 L. 18; R. 1059, L. 7-1060 
L. 22). 
Mr. Williams testified that the normal practice for 
title companies in closings, and his practice, was that if he 
became aware that seller and lender terms differed, that these 
had to be pointed out to each, agreement had to be arrived at 
and, to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a writing stating the 
agreement had to be executed. (R. 1063 L. 9 - 1065 L. 6). 
Not being advised by Interlake of the difference in 
terms, and Coombs' young realtor, Paul Scott, not being aware 
of the difference (R. 1219, L.5-1220, L.2), Williams handled 
the closing in due course, and had the documents recorded, 
first the deed to Interlake, then the deed to Perkins, 
fntending to give Interlake priority. (R. 1068, L. 3-25). 
CIC promptly defaulted on its payments, both to 
Interlake and to Perkins. The first part of this case, Phase 
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I, deals with the issue of who should have priority on the 
foreclosure proceeds, the Perkins or Interlake, This involves 
consideration of the conduct and attitude of each. 
Mr. Adams was the subject of fairly intense 
examination on the attitude of Interlake toward the Perkins. 
His answers stand by themselves. 
"Q. Did you obtain or ask him (Coombs) to submit to 
you a copy of the earnest money or the contract that 
he had with the Perkins? 
A. No, I did not. (R. 1023 L. 2-5). 
Q. Did you prepare any document for the Perkins1 to 
sign indicating that they would be willing to take a 
position secondary against security to Interlake? 
A. No, I did not." (R. 1023 L. 12-15) 
,fQ. OK. What was your understanding as to his 
(Coombs) use of the money? 
A. Mr. Coombs told me he was purchasing the property. 
Q. Huh. 
A. He wanted a loan from me to purchase the property. 
Q. Uh-huh. Did you make any effort to determine if 
the amount you were lending Mr. Coombs and CIC was the 
amount authorized by the sellers as a downpayment on 
the property? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you make any effort to determine if the 
interest rate authorized by the sellers for a 
downpayment was the same interest rate you were 
charging Mr. Coombs and CIC? 
A. No. I did not. 
Q. And you made no effort of any kind to communicate 
your loan to Mr. Coombs to the Perkinsf? 
A. I had no dealings with the Perkins at all. 
(R. 1027 L. 14 - 1028 L. 6) 
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Q. Now, what was your position in regard to the 
Perkins1 on this property. What concern did you have 
about them and their security in the property? 
A. The only concern I had was placing Interlake Thrift 
in a first position on the loan." 
(R. 1023 L. 22 - 1024 L. 1) 
Q. Well, you knew that the property was appraised at 
$39,700, that Mr. Coombs was only borrowing about half 
that amount." 
A. Yes, I knew that. 
Q. $17,000 in real money, but standing against the 
property as a loan of $20,700? 
A. That's the amount of our loan, yes.,f 
IR. 1034 L. 9-15) 
Q. And your interest charges on this loan were how 
much? 
A. The finance charge, based on the amount financed at 
$20,756.44, the finance charge was $41,000—or I'm 
sorry—$24,123.56. 
Q. And in addition to the $3,700 that was shown as 
paper transaction? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. And you wanted all of this to constitute a lien 
standing ahead of the Perkins? 
A. Yes, that's true. 
Q. And you never considered whether Perkins would 
agree to be second to those amounts or interest 
rates? 
A. I never considered whether anyone would. My 
specific instructions were to be solely in a first 
position with no other liens or encumbrances in front 
of us, period.". [Emphasis added] 
(R. 1039, L. 10-25) 
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Opposed to the active concealment by Interlake and 
Coombs of existing, material facts, the only act chargeable 
against the Perkins is that at the closing they asked no 
questions as they assumed their offer had been honored-an 
assumption supported by law as the Arguments will demonstrate. 
At the closing it was not only the Perkins and their 
agent Mr. Lucero, who failed to sense danger. Mr. Coombs* own 
realtor, Paul Scott, testified at trial that he attended the 
whole closing and was shocked to find out later, when Perkins 
subpoenaed him, that Interlake*s terms differed from the earnest 
money authorization. (R. 1219, L. 6-1120, L.15). 
Interlake*s tactics of keeping the closing officer in 
the dark as to its loan terms can fairly be interpreted as an 
intent by Interlake to seize a profitable loan opportunity 
regardless of harm to others, not only the Perkins, but also 
Guaranty Title Company, Mr. Williams, and the underwriter, 
Southern Title Guaranty Company. When the flawed contract led 
to litigation, Interlake immediately sued all of them for 
fiduciary liability and for recoupment of fees and costs and 
won. This is the "failsafe position" put into operation. 
Southern Title chose to take its losses on Interlake*s judgment 
against it, paid it, and did not join the appeal. 
Interlake's attitude toward Guaranty Title was 
succinctly stated: 
Q. Well, how can you possibly expect Guaranty to 
give you a priority when they don*t know the terms 
of your loan? 
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A. (Adams) I donft believe they need to 
know the terms of my loan. 
IR. 1051, L. 13-17). 
This "no need to know" attitude of Interlake towards 
Guaranty was misplaced. Guaranty was clearly acting as 
Interlake's agent to get Interlake first priority before the 
loan proceeds were disbursed. Mr. Williams acknowledged that 
he knew it was his obligation to do this. (R. 1066, L. 
19-1067, L.20). 
The failure of Mr. Williams to advise the Perkins as 
to Interlakefs loan terms is a directly imputable concealment 
of material fact right back to Interlake itself. The testimony 
of Perkins closing expert, Rodney Pipella, house counsel to 
Security Title, was not rebutted. He testified that as a 
matter of standard business practice the closing officer is the 
agent for all those affected by the closing, and that includes 
Mr. Williams being agent for Interlake. (R. 1064, L. 5-1065, 
L. 6; 1107, L. 5-13; 1173, L. 4-17). 
This means that Interlake had an agent at the closing 
who failed to reveal to the Perkins that Interlake sought 
priority on a loan in excess of what the Perkins had 
authorized, which took from them their chance to object. 
Accordingly, Mr. Williams' unwitting concealment of 
the Interlake loan terms is the act of Interlake. 
Judge Fishier erred in finding that Interlake should 
have priority over Perkins. 
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PHASE II 
Interlake's ledger cards indicate that during the year 
1981, Coombs remained continuously delinquent in his personal 
loan (Ex, 13), and that his corporation, CIC, remained 
continuously delinquent in its loan (Ex. 14; R. 1348 L. 
11-24). These ledgers have many notes indicating promises to 
pay by Coombs which were not kept. 
In October, 1981, Interlake's vice-present, Mr. 
Adams, met with Mr. Coombs. Adams gave Coombs options of pay, 
be sued, or consolidate. Coombs agreed to consolidate both his 
personal loan and the CIC corporate loan into a single loan (R. 
1385 L. 10-1386 L. 7). Coombs was to receive no cash. The 
consolidated loan would bear interest at 24% and be secured by 
Perkins' home. (R. 1349 L. 4-1351 L. 15; R. 1357, L. 17-24). 
The advantage to Coombs was that he would not have to 
repay the personal loan because it would be secured by the 
Perkins1 property. The advantage to Interlake, in view of 
Coombs1 history of non-payment, is that they would be assured 
of recovering his personal loan. 
State banking procedure requires that a commercial 
loan have an executed "Declaration of Purpose" form to ensure 
chat a consumer not be treated as a commercial borrower, but 
rather be given the protection of the consumer loan laws. 
A Declaration of Purpose form declares that all of a 
loan is for commercial purposes and none of it is for personal 
use. Interlake prepared, and Coombs signed, a declaration of 
-17-
purpose for the new loan as being entirely commercial. (Ex. 51, 
R. 1389, L. 16-R. 1390, L. 5). The form was false as Coombs 
had his personal loan debt of $2,464 included in the new loan 
(R. 1353, L. 17-1354, L. 6). 
Interlake's combining of the two loans into the new 
commercial loan was improper for another reason. It carried 
24% interest (R. 1349, L. 4-1351 L. 15). The 24% exceeds the 
legal interest rate on a personal loan over $1,000. (70B-3-508, 
Utah Code Annotated; R. 1035, L. 25-1036, L. 6). No money 
passed hands in 1981 when the loans were consolidated. The 
personal loan never became a commercial loan. It had been 
borrowed and used for personal purposes. Accordingly, charging 
24% on it was illegal. 
70B-3-205 provides that on a rewrite or refinancing, 
and 70B-3-206, on a consolidation, that the interest rates may 
not exceed the interest provisions of 70B-3-508, i.e., 18%. 
Mr. Adams acknowleded that he knew the law at the time 
he prepared the Declaration of Purpose and new loan. (R. 1359, 
L. 2-R. 1361, L. 25). 
Why was Interlake willing to do these wrongful acts? 
Interlakefs gains in these procedures are multiple. 
The personal loan is not only secured, but draws 24% interst. 
The paperwork on its surface satisfies the state. Its accounts 
are "current," so that the pressures incident to delinquent 
accounts (R. 1396, L. 22-1397, L. 25) are relieved and, a 
primary factor, the new principal amount is $24,688.70, all of 
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which draws interest at 24% and all presumably recoverable from 
Perkins1 home. At that time, November 27 ,1981, both existing 
loans were stamped ,fPaid in Full." (Ex. 13, Ex. 14) 
History repeats. As Interlake had had to figure a way 
of getting its loan ahead of Perkins without their knowledge in 
Phase I, now it had the problem of getting Perkins to agree to 
subordinate to the new loan incorporating an unrelated loan. 
Mr. Adams solved this problem, as he had the other 
one, by not dealing with the Perkins directly. 
Q. Mr. Adams in the Subordination Agreement of 
November 27, 1981, will you please tell the court 
who prepared that document? 
A. Interlake Thrift prepared it. 
Q. And can you tell the court, then what 
happened in a sequence of events as far as you 
Know until you received that document back? 
A. Interlake Thrift prepared this document in 
conjunction with the other documents of the loan 
of November 27, '81. This document was given to 
Mr. Coombs to obtain signatures of Mr. and Mrs. 
Perkins on it. 
(R. 1390, L. 8-18). 
Interlake ran into a problem because the Perkins 
refused to sign the subordination agreement Coombs gave them. 
MQ. (King) And did you give the responsibility 
to Mr. Coombs for taking the subordination 
agreement which you had prepared to the Perkins 
for execution? , 
A. (Adams) Yes, I did. 
Q. And to your knowledge, the Perkins refused 
to sign that subordination, did they not? 
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A, That's what Mr. Coombs had alleged to me 
early in December of 1981. 
Q. Well, you had a number of conversations with 
him between November 27, 1981 and December 30, 
1981, in which you were trying to get the 
subordination signed and he was telling you that 
he was having trouble with the Perkins, isn't 
that true? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. 1354, L. 9-1355, L. 1) 
The Perkins called Adams in December, 1981, after 
Coombs had talked to them, and Adams told the Perkins he would 
foreclose the trust deed if they didn't sign the subordination. 
(R. 1355, L. 2- 1356, L. 8). 
Mr. Adams acknowledged that when he spoke to the 
Perkins on the telephone and told them he was going to foreclose 
unless they signed the subordination, he didn't tell them that 
the commercial loan was being increased from its stated 18% 
(based on $3,541 being held as points, on a 18% loan) to a flat 
24%, nor that he was incorporating Coombs personal loan into the 
loan secured by their home, nor that he was limiting to one year 
the time that Coombs/CIC had to repay the entire amount. (R 
1362, L. 1-10) . 
Mr. Adams acknowledged that during the period from 
November 27 to December 30, 1981, he had a good deal of work 
with Mr. Coombs and the CIC files. (R. 1362, L. 1-1363, L. 1). 
Mr. Adams acknowledged that at the time he spoke to the 
Perkins he had personal knowledge that the new loan included the 
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personal loan secured by the Perkins property. (R 1363, L. 
18-1364, L. 13). 
The Perkins sought legal advice and contacted a Salt 
Lake City attorney, Robert Knight. 
Mr. Knight called Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams told Mr. Knight 
that he was rewriting the CIC loan and needed to have the 
Perkins subordinate to it. Knight asked Adams what the amount 
of the new loan would be and Adams told him that it would be the 
existing loan plus accumulated interest and charges. Mr. Adams 
withheld telling Mr. Knight that the new loan would include an 
unsecured personal loan which would then stand as a lien against 
the Perkins property in front of the Perkins. He also did not 
tell Mr. Knight that the time of payment was being reduced to 
one year from 10 years. (R 1364, L. 23-1372, L. 2). 
Mr. Adams knew that the Perkins and their attorney Mr. 
Knight were relying on him as to the subordination. He withheld 
telling them of Coombs personal loan. 
'
fQ. (By Mr. King) Let me direct your attention 
to your conversation with the Perkinsf. 
Youfve already admitted that you did not tell 
them about including the personal loan. Do you 
recall that? 
A. Yes. We've already discussed that. 
Q. All right. Now, why didn't you tell them? 
A. Because the issue never came up. All they 
wanted to know was what position Interlake 
Thrift held and what would happen if the sub-
ordination agreement was not signed. --
Q. Do you know of any means the Perkins1 would 
have of knowing that Coombs had a personal loan 
with you that was delinquent if you hadn't told 
them? 
-21-
A. That was Mr. Coombs' obligation. I had 
no obligation to Mr. and Mrs. Perkins. Mr. 
Coombs was my borrower. [Emphasis added] 
Qo And you felt that you had no obligation 
co the Perkinsf to tell them that you were 
going to use their former home as security 
for you on a personal loan of Mr. Coombs? 
A. I don't believe I had any obligation to 
them in any regard. [Emphasis added] 
(R 1381, L2-23). 
The effect of this remarkable testimony is that 
Interlake Thrift felt it had no duty to an elderly couple to 
tell them that they wanted to use the couple's home as equity to 
secure payment of a delinquent personal loan by a man who had 
repeatedly made and broken promises to bring the account 
current. (Ex. 13) 
The attitude of Interlake Thrift raises the question as 
to when "obligations" arise if not then. 
In dealing with the attorney Mr. Knight, Mr. Adams had 
a similar attitude: 
'Q. (By Mr. Hunt) In your telephone conference 
with Mr. and Mrs. Perkins some time in the month 
of December or November, and in your subsequent 
conversation with Mr. Knight and your letter of 
December 30, which is before you, 1981, wherein 
you talked about the subordination agreement and 
other matters, did you feel that you had complied 
with whatever disclosure provisions that you were 
required to make? 
A. Yes, I do. Like I mentioned before, I felt 
that we had disclosed to our borrower, Mr. Coombs, 
every pertinent bit of information about the loan 
in every regard. We had supplied the subordin-
ation agreement for signatures of Mr. and Mrs. 
Perkins. As far as disclosing to Mr. Knight, I 
don't think I had any duty to disclose anything 
to him. [Emphasis added] (R 1393, L. 17-1394, L. 10) 
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It is important to note, as Perkins1 claim is not 
against Mr. Adams, but against Interlake, that in withholding 
information from the Perkins, on the basis that they were junior 
lienholders and not people to whom Interlake had any contractual 
obligation, that Mr. Adams was complying with Interlake policy. 
This is spelled out by Mr. Adams: 
Q. (By Mr. King) I understand your testimony 
to be that in everything you did here you complied 
with the existing practices and procedures of 
Interlake Thrift, your employer; is that right? 
A. Yes, we did. I did act on behalf of Inter-
lake under our normal procedures. 
Q. Is the practice and normal procedure 
of Interlake Thrift when it seeks 
co obtain a subordination agreement from an 
intervening lienholder to not advise the 
lien holder of increases in the renewed loan 
not directly relating to the secured property? 
A. Any time we obtain a subordination agreement 
we furnish the subordination agreement to them 
totally prepared. 
Q. You didn't answer my question, sir. 
A. Yes, I did. Because that's what we do. 
I don't discuss any of the detail with any 
junior lien holders. 
Q. The specific question was if Interlake 
Thrift increases the loan, such as it did, 
by including personal material, it is the 
practice of Interlake Thrift to not let 
the other lienholder know? 
A. We don't call them up and tell them, yes, 
this was it or this wasn't it. We supply them 
with the subordination agreement. 
Q. But none of the supporting data so they 
can see where that fits in context? 
A. No. 
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Q. That is the practice of Interlake 
Thrift not to do that? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And the purpose of Interlake Thrift in 
doing that is that if people realized that 
obligations or changes in interest rate are 
oeing put before them they are going to 
object to them. 
A. In actual practice, that they want to 
object to or not object to it totally is up to 
them. We supply the subordination agree-
ment, which clearly spells out our loan in 
the amount they would subordinate to. 
Q. Right. And the practice of Interlake Thrift 
would be not to give them the other information 
oy which they can determine if the subordination 
is strictly a rewrite of an existing loan or 
whether it includes additions in interest or 
other charges for other loans. That is 
Interlake's practice, is it not? 
A. Usually it is, (R 1415, L. 9-1417, L. 6) 
It only takes a moments thought to realize the 
difficulty Interlakefs practice puts a junior lienholder to. 
If Inter lake says that "X" amount is the amount that 
has to be paid, and that the junior lienholder has to 
subordinate to it or that amount will be foreclosed, the junior 
lienholder has no way of evaluating that dollar amount. How 
many payments have been made, how many have been missed. What 
charges have been properly assessed, what costs incurred? 
Lacking this information, they reasonably rely on the figures 
submitted by a state licensed lending institution such as 
Interlake, and that the subordination is the amount of the 
actual delinquency plus normal interest and charges. 
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At Mr. Knight's request, Interlake put in a letter the 
representation that the new loan increased the old loan only by 
accumulated interest and costs and threatened foreclosure if 
Perkins didn't subordinate. (Ex. 50; Addendum VI). 
As found by Judge Fishier in the Statement of Facts on 
Phase IIf Interlake Thrift committed fraud when it induced the 
Perkins to sign the subordination agreement. The result was 
that the Perkins entirely lost all equity in their home, Coombs 
having taken bankruptcy and his company CIC having become 
defunct. They will never be repaid unless it is from 
Interlake. On October 27, 1981 Interlake marked as fully paid 
both of its ledgers on its existing loans to Coombs and to CIC* 
As soon as Perkins signed the subordination agreement on 
December 30, 1981, it filed a new trust deed with the County 
Recorder on the new, 1981, consolidated loan. As the Perkins1 
trust deed was executed in 1980, the Perkins now have a year's 
priority and should be entitled to the proceeds from the home. 
The Perkins1 home on Jeremy Street was sold by 
Interlake in 1982 for $28,700. At that time the Perkins had 
commenced their lawsuit, but to keep the home unsold until the 
lawsuit was resolved was not practical, so counsel for Perkins 
and for Interlake agreed that Interlake could use its expertise 
to sell the home and would then hold the proceeds of the sale 
subject to direction of the court as to which, Perkins or 
Interlake, had priority. 
Judge Fishier's Findings of Fact concerning Phase II 
are set forth verbatim at Addendum II. The Perkins believe 
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these facts are essentially accurate as far as they go, but 
don't go far enough, and that many of them are actually 
conclusions of law which are inappropriate to the facts, as will 
be stated in Phase II argument• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Perkins (appellants) argument as to Phase I of the 
trial court's decision is that the trial court's conclusions of 
law are not supported, either by its own findings of fact or by 
the evidence. 
Perkins believe they were purchase money vendors of the 
Jeremy property, and that Interlake, having failed to meet the 
terms of subordination in the ClOPerkins earnest money 
agreement, did not obtain priority over the Perkins, either by 
the earnest money agreement, the recording acts, or theories of 
waiver/estoppel or merger. 
As to Phase II of the trial, Perkins arguments are 
related to remedies and damages . First, that the trial court 
ignored their election of the remedy of rescission, which they 
believe would result in their having first priority in the 
property. Second, that if the court was correct in awarding 
actual damages, its determination was erroneous. Third, that 
the court abused its discretion in failing to award punitive 
damages. Fourth, the court awarded inadequate fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ITS FINDINGS OF FACT IN 
PHASE I, NOR BY THE EVIDENCE, 
Perkins' primary argument on appeal with respect to 
Phase I in the trial court is that the courtfs legal analysis 
of its own findings of fact (as well as undisputed, or 
admitted, facts) was erroneous. On a review of questions of 
law, the Supreme Court need pay no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions, but is empowered to determine on its 
own the correct legal analysis based upon the factual findings 
of the trier of fact. Wade v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 
9 UAR 13 (1985); Bradshaw v. Burningham, Utah, 671 P.2d 196 
11983). 
A. UNDERLYING FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Perkins believe that the trial court's Findings of 
Fact compel a verdict favorable to them as to priority on the 
Jeremy property. The key findings, Perkins believe, are the 
following: 
1. Perkins agreed in the earnest money agreement to 
sell their house to Coombs investment Corporation (hereinafter 
called CIC) and to subordinate to a loan of approximately 
$17,000 at 14% interest. (Addendum III) 
2. Perkins were purchase money vendors (in 
possession). (Addendum I, Addendum Ill-Counteroffer) 
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3. The loan actually obtained by CIC from Interlake 
was $20,756.44 at an effective interest rate of 24% and that it 
was not approximately $17,000 at 14% (i.e. material 
difference). (Addendum I, F.F. 12) 
4. Perkins were not advised of the actual terms of the 
loan from Interlake to CIC. (Addendum I, F.F. 6) 
B. BASED UPON COURTfS FINDINGS OF FACT, ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE ERRONEOUS. 
I. Perkins, as purchase money vendors, have presumed 
priority. 
The well-settled law in Utah as well as other 
jurisdictions is that special priority is accorded a vendor*s 
purchase money mortgage. See, e.g., Nelson v. Stoker, Utah, 
669 P2d 390 (1983); Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 24 U2d 
288, 470 P.2d 390 (1970). 
A leading treatise indicates that: 
"It is familiar learning that a purchase money 
mortgage, executed at the same time as the deed 
of purchase of land, or in pursuance of 
agreement as part of one continuous transaction, 
takes precedence over any other claim or lien 
attaching to the property through the vendee 
mortgagor. This is so even though the claim 
antedates the execution of the mortgage to the 
seller ... .ff 
IV American Law of Property, Sec. 16.106E at 220-21 
11952). 
Further, another leading authority has shown the 
broad extent of such presumption favoring a purchase money 
vendor: 
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"This rule, of course, is not confined to judgments 
and attachments; on the contrary, it extends to all 
liens, legal or equitable, that otherwise might 
clasp the land at and with its acquisition by the 
mortgagor. All such liens, indifferently, yield to 
the purchase money mortgage." 
II. G. Glenn, Glenn On Mortgages, Sec. 345.1 at 14.40 
(1943); accord, Nelson v. Stoker, supra. 
The policy behind giving a vendor such special priority 
over other liens has been stated as follows: 
"[The doctrine is justified] on the equity and 
justice of protecting one who has parted with his 
property on the faith of having a security 
interest in it until the money for which he was 
exchanging it is received, as against persons who, 
for different reasons, have inferior claims. ... 
As against other mortgagee claimants to the 
property, especially those who have made their 
ioan for the purpose of paying part of the 
purchase price, the question is closer [than those 
claiming through dower, curtesy, community 
property or homestead rights or judgment liens]. 
These, unlike the others, have relied upon getting 
paid out of the same specific property and have 
parted with value on that reliance. Even so, the 
vendor has the edge because the property he is 
relying on for payment was previously his up to 
the time of sale and mortgage back. There was 
never an instant when he relinquished a hold on 
it. And he would never have parted with it at all 
except upon the belief and faith that if his buyer 
defaulted, he could either recapture his property 
or get paid out of it. And this is normally so 
even though he may know that his buyer is going to 
finance the deal in part by borrowing some of the 
purchase money from another and by giving him a 
mortgage on the property. Other mortgagees, on 
-29-
the other hand, even including lenders of purchase 
money, parted only with money in which they retain 
no interest whatsoever, and place their reliance 
for repayment of their debts on getting a security 
interest in other property not only never 
previously owned by them, but not even owned by 
the mortgagor at the time the money was loaned, 
even though they might not have known that fact. 
This difference in attitude towards the hazard of 
losing the property previously owned and that of 
not getting an interest in property which had 
never before belonged to the claimant is an old 
and important one," 
IV, American Law of Property, supra, at pages 225-226. 
Accord, G. Osborne, G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate 
Finance Law, Sec. 9.1 at pp. 577-578 (1979) (hereinafter, 
G. Osborne). 
Perkins, who owned the subject property free and clear 
prior to the transactions in question, and who took back a 
crust deed to secure the balance of the purchase price, are 
clearly purchase money vendors entitled to those presumptions. 
It is equally clear that Interlake's lien is not a 
purchase money mortgage, and hence not entitled to any 
equitable presumptions that go with that position. A third-
party lender may obtain this status only where the money was 
loaned soely as purchase money paid to the vendor. IV American 
Law of Property, supra, at o, 229, Accord, G. Osborne, supra 
at p. 574. 
Since portions of Interlakefs loan went either 
directly back to Interlake as points (Addendum IV, $3,451.40) 
or to Coombs as excess (Addendum V, $4,578.79), it was not used 
only for payment of the purchase price on the Jeremy property 
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and Interlake's interest does not qualify as a purchase money 
interest* 
2. Subordination in earnest money not effective. 
Of course, a subordination agreement is one way 
purchase money vendors may relinquish the special priority 
accorded them under the law. However, the facts of this case 
cannot support such a relinquishment. 
It is generally accepted that subordination agreements 
are to be strictly construed and where terms of a subordination 
have not been complied with, the subordination agreement is 
ineffective and unenforceable. See, e.g., Troj v. Cheseboro, 
JO Conn. Sup. 30, 296 A.2d 685 (1972) (Subordination lacked 
certainty in minimum terms and was unenforceable.) Miller v. 
Citizen1s Savings and Loan Association, Ct.App., 56 Cal. Rptr. 
741 (1967) (Subordination conditions were not satisfied and 
hence construction money trust deeds were not entitled to 
priority over purchase money trust deeds.); Gluskin v. Atlantic 
Savings & Loan Association, Ct.App., 108 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1973) 
(Lender and purchaser-borrower may not bilaterally make 
material modification in loan agreement to which vendor has 
subordinated his purchase money deed of trust without the 
knowledge and consent of the vendor to that transaction.) 
Campanella v. Ranier National Bank, 26 Wash. App. 418, 612 P.2d 
460 (1980) (Subordination agreement strictly limited to express 
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terms and conditions of agreement); Ban-Co Inv. Co. v. 
Loveless, 22 Wash. App. 122, 537 P.2d 567 (1978) (Subordination 
agreement is to be strictly construed.) 
Thus, the terms of the earnest money agreement are 
conditions precedent to the subordination becoming effectivec 
The loan obtained by CIC from Interlake was for $20,756.44 at 
an effective interest rate of 24%, a substantial and material 
difference from the terms set forth in the earnest money, as 
the court found in Phase I's Finding of Fact No. 12 (Addendum 
I), that it was not approximately $17,000 at 14% interest. 
On substantially identical facts, the Court in 
Gluskin, supra, held that: 
•'A lender and borrower may not bilaterally make a 
material modification in the loan to which the 
seller has subordinated, without the knowledge 
and consent of the seller to that modification, 
if the modification materially affects the 
seller's rights." 
Id. at 323. 
Thus, as was held in Gluskin, and as should be held 
in the instant case, the conditions precedent were not met and 
the subordination was not obtained. The loan, of course, was 
made and CIC purchased the property, but Interlake must bear 
the loss as against the Perkins because their loan did not 
qualify for priority. As the court in Miller, supra, stated: 
•'It follows that the payment by Citizen's to Wes 
Glenn of the disputed $26,341.30 was not illegal, 
but merely that it was a loan not within the 
subordination agreement and, therefore, subject 
to and not prior to plaintiffs' trust deed and 
the $95,000 obligation which that trust deed 
secured." 
Id. at 852. 
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Additionally, Interlake is barred from alleging that 
any modification of the earnest money agreement terms was 
accepted by Perkins. The statute of frauds and cases 
interpreting it require that any modification of a contract 
which is required to be in writing, as here dealing with an 
interest in real property, must also be in writing. See, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) Sections 25-5-1, 3; Zions Properties, 
Inc. v. Holt, Utah, 538 P.2d 1319 (1975); Coombs v. 
Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970); Combined Metals 
v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 267 P. 1020 (1928). 
No such writing exists and therefor no such 
modification may be asserted. 
3. NO BASIS TO MAKE EXCEPTION AS IN KEMP CASE. 
The trial court felt the instant action was 
comparable to the case of Kemp v. Zions First National Bank, 
supra, and found that plaintiffs had waived their priority 
rights by failing to inquire as to the terms of the CIC loan 
at the closing. Perkins believe that the instant action in 
fact lacks the factors which prompted the Kemp court to 
deviate from the general rule, stated in Kemp , of purchase 
money vendor priority which favors the Perkins. 
A review of the Kemp case reveals that the decision 
is pinned on two possible rationales, the recording acts, 
and the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. It will be 
seen that the facts which gave rise to those lynchpins in 
Kemp are absent in this case. 
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(a) The recording acts offer Interlake no 
refuge. 
Ln Kemp, the vendors conveyed their property to 
ouyers by warranty deed and took a mortgage back to secure 
che balance of the purchase price, which they failed to 
record for over a year. Buyers then went to the lender the 
following day to sign up for a loan. The day after that, 
vendors went to the lender, discussed the loan and the 
allocation of the proceeds to them and accepted the balance 
as their downpayment without disclosing to the lender their 
retained interest. The lender promptly recorded its trust 
deed. Id. at 392. 
Thus, under the facts in Kemp, along with the 
indication of a waiver/estoppel, the court was faced with a 
recording act issue and found that a prior recorded trust 
deed of the lender (a subsequent purchaser) prevailed over 
the prior in time, but later recorded, purchase money 
mortgage of the vendor. Id. If the vendors in Kemp had 
promptly recorded their interest on the day they received 
their trust deed to secure the balance of the purchase 
price, the lender might have discovered it in a last minute 
title check before disbursing its funds. The lender in Kemp 
was in fact within the class of persons the recording acts 
were designed to protect, subsequent purchasers in good 
faith. 
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In the instant action, the recording acts do not 
come to bear on the priority issue, because Interlake was 
not a subsequent purchaser in good faith. The pertinent 
section of Utah's recording statutes is Section 57-3-3, 
U.C.A. It provides as follows: 
"57-3-3. Effect of Failure to Record—Every 
conveyance of real estate hereafter made, 
which shall not be recorded as provided in 
this title, shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for 
valuable consideration of the same real 
estate, or any portion thereof, where his own 
conveyance shall be first duly recorded." 
[Emphasis added.] 
As seen from the language of the statute, the 
recording act provides protection only to "subsequent 
purchasers in good faith." Perkins believe that Interlake was 
not a purchaser in good faith, because of the inquiry notice 
they were put on as to Perkins' interest in the property, 
discussed infra, but regardless of such status, the documents 
show that Interlake was not a subsequent purchaser, but a 
prior one, and hence can claim no protection from the 
recording statutes. This fact is illustrated by a leading 
authority as follows: 
,fUnder most recording acts, a mortgagee is 
protected against a prior unrecorded mortgage if 
he took his mortgage without knowledge and, in 
some states, if he recorded it first. 
••Most institutional lenders are required to, or 
at least desire to hold first mortgages. The 
third party lender cannot however, guarantee 
this priority status simply by making sure that 
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its mortgage is recorded first, unless of 
course, the land is in one of the few 
jurisdictions having a "race" recording act [not 
Utah], under which being the first to record 
assures priority. A couple of hypotheticals 
will illustrate why this is so. Suppose, for 
example, that vendor, purchaser and third party 
lender are each aware that the purchase price 
will be financed by two purchase money 
mortgages. Where two such mortgages are going 
to be utilized, it normally will be known by all 
of the parties because they will be referred to 
in the earnest money contract, a copy of which 
the third party lender routinely requires and 
examines before approving a loan. In this 
situation, the third party lender cannot gain 
priority simply by recording first because it 
will have taken and recorded with knowledge of 
the vendor' s mortgage. While recording first 
will not, for the same reason, give the vendor 
priority, the general presumption in favor of 
the vendor purchase money mortagees probably 
will. Moreover, even if the third party lender 
takes and records its mortgage prior to the 
execution of the vendorf s mortgage and without 
knowledge of it, it cannot rely on the recording 
act to achieve priority because such legislation 
normally protects only those without notice who 
take subsequent to an unrecorded instrument." 
G. Osborne, supra, Sec. 9*2 at pp. 578-580. [Emphasis added] 
Since the trust deed and loan between CIC and 
Interlake were executed on October 29, 1980, two days prior to 
Perkins* trust deed security, Interlake cannot qualify as a 
subsequent purchaser as against the Perkins' interest and 
receives no benefit from Utahfs recording acts. 
(b) No basis for waiver/estoppel. 
The trial court concluded that Perkins had waived, 
or were estopped from claiming, priority ahead of Interlake 
(Addendum I, paragraphs 12, 15), as had been the case between 
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the lender and vendor in Kemp, As will be seen from comparing 
the factual backgrounds of Kemp and the instant action, the 
trial court*s legal conclusion of waiver and/or estoppel by the 
Perkins is unfounded and erroneous* 
In Kemp, the vendors discussed the loan with the 
lender, accepted the proceeds and never advised the lender of 
their retained interest, nor did they promptly record their 
trust deed, discussed supra. The court found that the vendors 
knew the lender would require a first priority position, and 
having failed to disclose their interest to the lender, either 
during their discussions with it or by recording promptly, they 
were not in a position to then claim priority. 
The facts of this case are markedly different from 
those in Kemp and do not provide a basis for abandoning the 
general rule of purchase money vendor priority. 
The Perkins had agreed in the earnest money 
agreement to subordinate to a loan of approximately $17,000 at 
14% interest. They had no contact with the lender, Interlake, 
and appeared at the closing to receive a down payment and 
credits in complete conformity to the terms of their earnest 
money agreement (see sellers1 closing statement, Ex. 9-P). 
Interlake, on the other hand, made no efforts to 
determine the terms of the sale from Perkins to CIC, (Adams, R. 
i023, L.2-8), nor did it make any attempt to see if its loan 
complied with the terms of the Earnest Money (Adams, R. 1027, 
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Lc 19-R. 1028, L. 6). It was aware that CIC intended to buy the 
property and that CIC wanted a loan of around $20,000c It had 
a P.R. which indicated the Perkins were free and clear 
titleholders to the propertye (Ex. 11-P, Adams, R. 1022, Lc 
9-19) It had an appraisal which indicated the property was 
valued at $39,700 (Ex. 3-P; Adams, R. 1021, L. 21 - R. 1022, L. 
3) Although Interlake maintains it had no knowledge of 
the Perkins* retained interest, plaintiffs believe the evidence 
does show such actual knowledge, and, in any event, the law 
imputes constructive notice to Interlake under the facts before 
the trial court. 
The record reveals the following testimony by 
Interlake*s manager, Mr. Adams: 
Qc And you wanted all this to constitute a lien 
standing ahead of the Perkins? 
A. (Mr. Adams) Yes, thatf s true. 
R. 1039, L. 16-19. 
Supplementing this strong evidence of actual knowledge 
of Perkins1 retained interest by Interlake, the law applied to 
the facts of this case imputes such knowledge to Interlake. 
Utah courts have held that whatever is notice enough 
to excite attention and put a party on his guard and call for 
inquiry is "notice" of everything to which such inquiry might 
have led, and when a person has sufficient information to lead 
him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it. See, 
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e.g., Universal C.I.T. Corp. v, Courtesy Motors, 8 Utah2d 275, 
333 P.2d 638 (1959); Salt Lake, Garfield & Western Railway Co, 
v. Allied Materials Co,, 4 Utah2d 218, 291 P.2d 883 (1955). 
Additionally, Perkins were in actual exclusive 
possession of their home on Jeremy and (earnest money 
counteroffer, Addendum III) of which Interlake was aware 
(Adams, R. 1331, L. 8-11). The Utah Court has previously 
indicated that actual exclusive, possession of real property 
will put upon inquiry those acquiring any title to or lien 
upon the land so occupied to ascertain the nature of the 
rights the occupants really have in the premises. Peterson v. 
Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P2d 814 (1957); Mathis v. 
Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952 (1953). 
These facts should impute constructive knowledge 
of Perkins1 retained interest in the Jeremy property, in spite 
of the fact that Interlake made no effort to obtain the 
earnest money, an effort which G. Osborne, supra, and Rodney 
Pipella, trial expert witness, described as the routine 
practice of lenders. (Pipella, R. 1140, L. 21-R. 1141, L. 
25). 
With this background in mind, the trial court's 
conclusion of waiver and/or estoppel cannot stand. The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined waiver as a voluntary and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right, claim or 
privilege. Hunter v. Hunter, Utah, 669 P.2d 420 (1983); 
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Rowley v, Marrcrest Homeowner's Association, Utah, 656 P. 2d 
414 (1982); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer 
Tractor and Implement, Inc., Utah, 626 P.2d 418 (1980). As 
the court stated in Hunter, supra: 
JfA waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must 
se an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it... . To constitute waiver, one's 
actions or conduct must be distinctly made, must 
evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to 
waive, and must be inconsistent with any other 
intent." 
Id. at 432. 
Since the Perkins were uninformed of the actual facts 
of the CIC Interlake loan, their silence at the closing cannot 
under the circumstances be viewed as actions or conduct 
"distinctly made" which "evince in some unequivocal manner an 
intent to waive." Nor is it "inconsistent with any other 
intent," since they received at the closing the payment and 
credits consistent with their earnest money agreement, and had 
every right to assume that the earnest money had been complied 
with. 
Similarly, the closely associated doctrine of estoppel 
does not apply here. 
"Estoppel arises when a party...by his acts, 
representations, or admissions, or by his silence 
when he ought to speak, intentionally or through 
comparable negligence, induces another...to 
believe certain facts to exist and that such 
other...acting with reasonable prudence and 
diligence, relies and acts thereon so that he will 
suffer an injustice if the former...is permitted 
to deny the existence of such facts." 
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Morgan v, Board of State Lands, Utah, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (1976). 
The facts of the instant case fail to support 
estoppel, just as they fail to support a waiver. Interlake did 
not act with reasonable prudence and diligence and, as 
indicated above, had constructive, if not actual, knowledge of 
Perkins1 agreement and terms with CIC. Nor did Perkins 
intentionally or through negligence induce Interlake to believe 
any facts upon which it could properly rely. 
4. NO DUTY ON PERKINS TO INQUIRE. 
The trial court in its ruling, determined that the 
Perkins1 had a duty at the closing to inquire as to what the 
actual terms of the CIC-Interlake loan were, to see if it met 
the terms of their earnest money agreement, and, having failed 
to do so, they "waived" their priority right. The Perkins 
believe this is the trial court1s pivotal error in its legal 
analysis. 
Aside from the plain fact that inquiring at the 
closing would likely have elicited no information from the 
closing officer since he admittedly had not been given such 
information from Interlake (R. 1056, L. 22 - R. 1058, L. 7 - R. 
1060, I*. 22), and materials from Interlake supported a belief 
that the earnest money agreement had been complied with (R. 
1063, L. 9 - R. 1065, L. 6), there is no basis to impose such a 
duty on the Perkins in any event. 
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Certainly there is no duty arising by way of 
contractual relationship. Perkins had set forth their terms on 
the earnest money agreement, in what was in essence an offer 
for a unilateral contract, that is, if a lender provided CIC 
with a loan of approximately $17,000 at 14% interest, Perkins 
would subordinate their trust deed security interest to that 
loan. 
However, Interlake chose not to accept Perkins1 
offer, the trial court finding that its loan to CIC was not 
approximately $17,000 at 14% interest. Hence, no contractual 
relation was formed between Perkins and Interlake and, 
therefore, no contractual duty could arise. 
Nor, under the facts of the case, could the Perkins be 
found to owe Interlake any duty based upon equitable grounds. 
The Perkins were elderly homeowners. Mr. Perkins was in 
post-retirement employment in the field of janitorial services, 
and had a limited education (Perkins, R. 1282, L. 19-24; R. 
1288, L. 22-23). They had agreed in the Earnest Money to 
subordinate their retained interest to a loan of approximately 
$17,000 at 14% interest. They were never contacted by 
Interlake (R. 1027, L. 14 - R. 1028, L.6). They attended the 
closing, where they signed the warranty deed, received their 
crust deed, and reviewed the seller's closing statement which 
indicated amounts credited to their account in line with the 
Earnest Money terms. 
Similarly, nothing at the closing alerted the 
professionals. Neither Perkins1 realtor, Mr. Lucero, Coombsf 
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realtor, Mr.Scott, nor the closing officer, Mr. Williams, 
raised any questions as to Interlake's loan, quite likely 
presuming that it would have reviewed the earnest money, as is 
the customary practice (G. Osborne, supra, at p. 578-580; 
Pipella, R. 1140, L. 21 - R. 1141, L. 25) 
Interlake, on the other hand, was a licensed financial 
institution experienced in real estate financing transactions. 
They knew Perkins were free and clear owners of the Jeremy 
property (preliminary report, Ex. 11-P). They knew that 
Perkins were in possession of the home (Adams, R. 1331, L. 
8-11). It knew CIC wished to obtain a loan of slightly over 
one-half the appraised value of the Jeremy property. 
(Appraisal, Ex. 3-P; loan, Ex. 6-P). Yet they failed to ask 
Coombs how he was going to purchase the property (Adams, R. 
1330), and failed to request a copy of the Earnest Money 
agreement (Adams, R. 1323, L. 2-12), which leading authorities 
(G. Osborne, supra, at P. 578-580) and an expert witness at 
trial (Pipella, P.1140, L. 21-R. 1141, L.25) have described as 
being the customary practice. i 
The imposition of a duty of inquiry on Perkins by the 
trial court in consideration of the above-cited facts was 
clearly erroneous. Who should bear the burdens and risks as 
between the Perkins, who set forth in the Earnest Money the 
terms they would subordinate to and which hold the preferred 
status as purchase money vendors, and Interlake, who desire to 
loan money on different terms and which wanted a priority not 
ordinarily afforded it? The answer is patently obvious and 
contrary to the trial court1s ruling. Since Interlake did not 
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request a modification of the terms of the earnest money 
agreement, which they, as seen above, had legal knowledge of, 
nor ask them to suborindate, the assumption on the part of 
Perkins and others at the closing that Interlake had conformed 
its loan to these terms is reasonable. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also endorsed the equitable 
principle that where one of two innocent parties must suffer a 
loss, it should fall on him who created the circumstances from 
which it resulted. Hanson v. Beehive Security Co., 14 Utah2d 
157, 380 P.2d 66 (1963). Although characterizing Interlake as 
an innocent party would be overly charitable, Perkins believe 
the facts show that the circumstances which created the loss 
were the following: Interlake's failure to acquire a copy of 
the Earnest Money or ask CIC for specifics of the purchase of 
the Jeremy property; Interlake's failure to inquire as to 
Perkins' interest in the property since they were in possession 
of it; Interlake's failure to provide the closing officer with 
documentation on its loan to CIC, which would have afforded him 
the opportunity to determine that the Earnest Money terms had 
not been met. Thus, under the law as stated in Hanson, supra, 
Interlake must bear the loss. 
5. MERGER UNFOUNDED AND UNAVAILING. 
The trial court has made reference to the doctrine 
of merger in its ruling. Perkins believe merger has no 
application in this action, but if applied, leads to the 
conclusion of priority in the Perkins. 
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First, the defense of merger was not pleaded by 
Interlake. However, assuming that the issue of merger was 
properly before the court, it is of no benefit to Interlake*s 
claim to priority. 
Like most rules of contractual construction, the 
merger doctrine is applied only when it is shown to be the 
intention of the parties. There is no evidence in the trial of 
this action that the parties intended the terms of their 
agreement as evidenced in the Earnest Money to be merged into 
the deeds. 
Additionally, the doctrine of merger operates only 
to bar extrinsic evidence which tends to vary or contradict the 
express terms of the final written instrument. VanLeeuwen v. 
Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 5 P.2d 714 (1931); Halloran-Judge Trust 
Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 248 P.342 (1927). As can be seen 
from an inspection of the deeds involved (Exhibits 5, 7), 
neither contains even the slightest indication of the 
intentions as to priority between Perkins and Interlake. 
Neither trust deed indicates "first" or "second", nor that one 
may be "subject to" the other. Thus, the merger principle does 
not bar extrinsic evidence to resolve the priority issue. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the doctrine does apply, 
one arrives at the conclusion that Perkins retain their first 
priority as purchase money vendors. 
If merger is accepted, the court was left with 
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three simple deeds: a warranty deed from Perkins to CIC, a 
trust deed from CIC to Perkins, and a trust deed from CIC to 
Interlake, without any other documentation as to the intent of 
the parties. Absent any expression as to priority on the face 
of the deeds, the Perkins must prevail on the general policy 
considerations which favor purchase money vendors. Kemp v. 
Zion's First National Bank, supra; IV American Law of Property, 
Section 16.106E (1952); II G. Glenn, Glenn on Mortages, Section 
345.1 (1943); G. Osborne, supra, Section 9.1 
And as seen previously, Interlake is not afforded 
protection by the recording statutes because they are not 
subsequent purchasers. Thus, priority based on the deeds alone 
is accorded to the Perkins by virtue of their special position 
as purchase money vendors. 
II. PHASE II - THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED 
PERKINS1 ELECTION OF REMEDIES WHICH 
WOULD HAVE PLACED THEM IN FIRST 
PRIORITY POSITION. 
Perkins had consistently sought both rescission and 
punitive damages in Phase II of the trial. Their election is 
reflected in the minute entry of the court, R. 728. 
The trial court apparently ignored Perkins* election 
and awarded $2,464.41 plus interest as their actual damages, 
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reflecting merely the amount of the personal loan of Dick 
Coombs included in the 1981 rewrite. (F.F. 10, 11, R. 818). 
Perkins believe rescission of the subordination would 
have left them in first priority position, since a rescission 
of the subordination agreement which was induced by fraud would 
have left Perkins with a secured position based on their 1980 
Whether the taking of a new mortgage in place of a 
prior one amounts to an extinguishment of the first mortgage is 
a question of the intention of the parties. First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Proudfit Sporting Goods Co., Utah, 552 P.2d 123 
(1976). 
It is quite clear from the evidence that the intent 
of Interlake and Coombs was to extinguish the prior mortgage. 
Adams testified that the old loan was totally paid, and 
satisfied, and cleared (Adams testimony, R. 1350, L. 16-22). 
The ledger on the loan itself was stamped f,paid in full." 
(EX.14-P) 
Additional indication of the intent to extinguish the 
prior mortgage is the language of the trust deeds themselves. 
The 1980 trust deed provided that the deed secured 
"..., the payment of such additional loans, 
or advances as may nereafter be made by 
Beneficiary to Trustor, its successors and/or 
assigns, when evidenced by a Promissory Note or 
Notes reciting that they are secured by this 
Trust Deed; ... ." 
Thus, by the terms of the 1980 trust deed, if the parties had 
intended the 1981 note to be secured by the 1980 trust deed, they 
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need only have said so- But the new 1981 note recites that it is 
secured by a trust deed of even date (Ex. 35-D), and the-1981 
trust deed likewise refers to the note of even date (Ex. 34-D)e 
On virtually identical facts, Judge Jenkins, in the 
Federal District Court for Utah, found a strong inference that it 
was the intent of the parties to satisfy and extinguish the prior 
deed and secure the new obligation with the latter deed. 
Peterson v. United States, D. Utah, 511 F.Supp. 250 (1981). 
This result is also supported by a leading authority on 
property law, who indicates that 
lf
... where the new mortgage secures a debt 
distinct from the old, or an additional debt; 
the satisfaction in such cases operating as a 
complete discharge of the first mortgage." 
8A G. Thompson, Thompson on Real Property, Section 4424 at p. 
207 (1963). 
Thus, the evidence clearly indicates an intention on 
Interlake's part to extinguish the 1980 mortgage. Since the 
trial court properly found that the 1981 subordination 
agreement was induced by fraud, a rescission of that agreement 
would leave Perkins in a first priority position, secured by 
the 1980 trust deed as against Interlake*s 1981 trust deed. 
Under the agreement made by the parties during the 
course of the litigation, by which Perkins released their lis 
pendens on the Jeremy property and allowed Interlake to 
foreclose in exchange for Interlake*s promise to be good for 
any damages to Perkins as found by the court, Interlake must 
-48-
pay Perkins the full balance on their secured interest, plus 
any interest accrued thereon. See, discu-ssion of agreement, 
R. 1382, L. 3 - R. 1383, L. 10; R. 984, L. 7 - R. 985, L. 4. 
Ill.TRIAL COURTS FINDING OF FAILURE OF 
PERKINS TO MITIGATE DAMAGES WAS IMPROPER 
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The court, in its bench ruling, found that Perkins 
were limited in their recovery for loss of their property 
because they hadn't bid in on the property in front of 
Interlake. The trial court made this ruling, sua sponte, even 
though Interlake had not pleaded nor argued mitigation of 
damages and plaintiffs were not prepared to respond to it when 
it was raised for the first time in the court1s bench ruling. 
(Bench Ruling, January 23, 1984, R. 982, L. 3-R. 985, L. 4). 
But for this ruling, Perkins' damages were substantially 
greater, up to the full amount of their secured position, as 
seen above. 
The law and the facts do not support the conclusion 
of failure to mitigate damages. First, no one is generally 
required to expend more sums of money to minimize their loss 
because this would require one to incur risks beyond those in 
the contract. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages, Section 37; Support, 
Alexander v. Brown, Utah, 646 P.2d 692 (1982). 
Second, because of the agreement of counsel for the 
parties allowing sale of the Jeremy property for the specific 
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purpose of avoiding further loss, the trial court's ruling 
that Perkins could have "totally" mitigated their damages by 
redeeming the property is completely unwarranted. See, Bench 
Ruling, January 23, 1984, R. 982, L. 3 - R* 985, L. 4* 
Certainly, since the Perkins did not discover the inclusion of 
Coombs1 personal loan in the rewrite until Mr* Adams' 
deposition in September, 1982 (R. 983, L. 10-18), their 
release of the property for sale by Interlake was the only 
action to mitigate that they had available by that time. 
Finally, the facts do not support such a limitation. 
The fraud was committed in late 1981, at which time the 
Interlake lien was $22,093.89. Perkins did not discover the 
fraud until after this action was begun. By agreement with 
Interlakefs counsel that Interlake would be good for any 
damages found by the court, Perkins released a lis pendens and 
allowed the foreclosure to proceed, in order to hold damages 
to a minimum. (Bench Ruling, supra). When the property was 
sold, Interlake1s bid at the trustee sale was $36,068.73. At 
about the same time the property value had dropped 
considerably from neglect during the CIC ownership, and was 
unmarketable for $32,800 (Anderson testimony, R. 1481, L. 
20-R. 1482, L. 2 and R. 1485, L. 5-24), and eventually was 
sold for $28,700 (R. 1406, L. 10-20). Obviously, by the time 
of the default after the loan rewrite and subordination, 
Perkins could not have mitigated their damages by bidding in 
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on the property at that time, since Interlakefs lien claim of 
$36,068.73 apparently exceeded the value of the property. The 
law does not require people to perform futile acts. 
What Perkins1 actual damage was from Interlake1s 
fraud, if rescission is not granted, was the value of the 
property over and above the Interlake lien at the time of the 
fraud. The only evidence of the market value of the Jeremy 
property at the time of the fraud in late 1981 is Interlakefs 
own estimate of $39,700 (Exhibit 39-D, "Real Estate Loan 
Summary"). Thus, the actual damage measure of loss for which 
Interlake should be liable to Perkins would be that market 
value minus Interlakefs prior lien interest, or $17,606." 
IV. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Perkins believe that the facts of the instant case 
demand the award of punitive damages, and the trial court*s 
failure to do so amounted to an abuse of discretion. 
Although punitive damages are admittedly awarded 
sparingly, the Utah Supreme Court has found it appropriate 
where conduct manifests a knowing or reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others. Synergetics 
v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., Utah, 12 UAR 15 (1985); 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., Utah, 675 P.2d 1179, 
1186 (1983). 
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Interlakefs conduct clearly indicated a knowing 
indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of the 
Perkins. The Utah Court has indicated several factors should 
be considered in the award of punitive damages: the nature of 
the alleged misconduct, the extent of the effect of the 
misconduct on the lives of plaintiffs and others, the 
probability of future recurrence of such misconduct, the 
relationship between the parties, the relative wealth of the 
defendant, the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
misconduct, and the amount of actual damages awarded. First 
Security Bank of Utah v, J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653 
P.2d 591, 598 (1982). A review of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding Interlake's misconduct and in relation to various 
of these factors reveals an established pattern which cheated 
the Perkins out of equity in their home. 
The nature of Interlake's misconduct was fraud as 
found by the court0 The facts show that in the fall of 1981, 
CIC was grossly delinquent in its loan secured by the Perkins1 
home and Coombs similarly delinquent in his unsecured personal 
loan. CIC had made so few payments that Interlake1s secured 
loan was larger than when it was first made (Adams, R. 1407, 
L18-22). Coombs1 personal loan was five months delinquent. 
(Adams, R. 1408, L10-13). Adams suggested a consolidation of 
the two (Adams R. 1404, L15-19), which would serve both Coombs 
and Interlake - Coombs by having his personal loan paid from 
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Perkins' equity and Interlake by making that which was hard to 
collect as a personal loan into a loan secured by the Perkins1 
nome. 
In consolidating, Interlake indulged in conspicuously 
improper actions. First, the regulated interest rate on the 
consumer loan was escalated from 18% to an unregulated 
commercial rate of 24% (70B-3-205, 206, 508, Utah Code 
Annotated), for which Interlake prepared a corporate 
declaration of purpose that the entire amount of the loan was 
used for commercial purposes which it knew (Ex. 51-P; Adams, 
R. 1357, L7-24). Then, it committed fraud in obtaining the 
Perkins* signatures on the subordination agreement. 
The entire trial of this case was replete with 
evidence of Interlake*s callous disregard of and indifference 
to the Perkins1 interest. In regard to the rewrite, Adams was 
asked to address himself to the concern that Interlake had for 
the Perkins: 
,fQ. (By Mr. King) Let me direct your 
attention to your conversation with the 
Perkins*. You've already admitted that 
you did not tell them about including the 
personal loan. You recall that? 
A. Yes. We've already discussed that. 
Q. All right. Now, why didn't you tell 
them? 
A. Because the issue never came up. All 
They wanted to know was what position 
Interlake Thrift held and what would 
happen if the subordination agreement was 
not signed. 
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Q. Do you know of any means the Perkins1 
would have of knowing that Coombs had a 
personal loan with you that was delinquent 
if you hadn't told them? 
A. That was Mr. Coombs' obligation• I 
had no obligation to Mr. and Mrs. Perkins. 
Mr. Coombs was my borrower. 
Q. And you felt that you had no obligation 
to the Perkins to tell them that you were 
going to use their former home as security 
for you on a personal loan of Mr. Coombs? 
A. I don't believe I had any obligation to 
them in any regard." (Adams, R. 1381, L2-23). 
And as to Mr. Knight's, Perkins' attorney, inquiry, 
Adams stated, "As far as disclosing to Mr. Knight, I don't 
think I had any duty to disclose anything to him." (Adams, R. 
1394, L8-10). 
Further testimony of Mr. Adams indicated that the 
policy of intentional non-disclosure was the accepted practice 
at Interlake; 
"Q. (By Mr. King) I understand your 
testimony to be that in everything you did 
here you complied with the existing prac-
tices and procedure of Interlake Thrift, your 
employer; is that right? 
A. (Mr. Adams) Yes, we did. I did act on 
behalf of Interlake under our normal pro-
cedures. 
Q. (By Mr. King) It is in the practice and 
normal procedure of Interlake Thrift when it 
seeks to obtain a subordination agreement from 
intervening lien holder to not advise the lien 
holder of increases in the renewed loan not 
directly relating to the secured property? 
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A. Any time we obtain a subordination 
agreement we furnish the suborindation agree-
ment to them totally prepared. 
Q. You didn't answer my question, sir. 
A. Yes, I did. Because that's what we do. 
I don't discuss any of the other details 
with any junior lien holders. 
Q. And the specific question was if Interlake 
Thrift increases a loan, such as it did, but 
including personal material, it is the practice 
of Interlake Thrift not to let the other lien 
holder know? 
A. We don't call them up and tell them yes, this 
was it or this wasn't it. We supply them with 
the subordination agreement. 
Q. But none of the supporting data so they can 
see where that fits in context? 
A. No. 
(Adams, R. 1415, L. 9-R. 1416, L. 14). 
Thus, the only reasonable inference is that it is 
virtually inevitable that the kind of fraud committed against 
the Perkins would recur. 
Pnitive damages is perhaps the only method of taking 
the profit out of such wrongdoing where, as here, the 
compensatory damages are small in relation to Interlakefs 
financial resources and can be subsumed as a cost of doing 
business. Support, Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 
supra, at 1187. 
There is not a word in the transcript indicating any 
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expression of regret by Interlake for the harm it has done the 
Perkins- Nowhere is there any indication that Interlake has 
undertaken different policies and procedures to avoid 
recurrence of this situation. Mr. Adams is still 
vice-president. 
The type of attitude and conduct displayed by 
Interlake should not be passively condoned as the trial court 
has done. Punitive damages are the only means of serving the 
societal interest of punishing Interlake, giving notice to 
others, and redressing the effect of its conduct on the 
Perkins. Judge Fishier erred in awarding not a penny in 
punitive damages. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUCING PERKINS' 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
Perkins1 attorneys, Samuel King and Eric Hartman, 
submitted affidavits as to their attorney fees in connection 
with Phase II (Ex. 54). They were not given an opportunity to 
testify, nor Interlake to cross examine. Their affidavits 
excluded all fees and costs for Phase I. 
Judge Fishier reduced the fees from $5,068.25 for Mr. 
King, and $5,047.50 for Mr. Hartman, to a total of $2,500 
without a factual basis for doing so, stating: 
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"The court has reviewed this file in detail, and 
it appears to this court that since this matter 
was filed in the summer of 1982, and the court 
is very familiar with all of the hearings that 
were held when this division of the court had 
law and motion, and all of the hearings 
subsequent, that the amount of the attorney's 
fees in this case just boggle the mind of the 
court• Therefore, in the discretion of the 
court, the court is not going to award Mr. and 
Mrs. Perkins the full amount of their attorney's 
fees; only $2500. That will be the judgment on 
that point.ff 
R. 976, L. 2-11. 
The court's rationale is hard to follow particularly as 
the judge gave Interlake the full fees it requested against 
Southern Title-$7,000-for Phase I. (R. 990, L. 15-25) 
Provided that Perkins' fees are- reasonable, it is 
proper that Interlake, not Perkins, nor their counsel, should 
absorb them. It is submitted that a glance at the whole file 
shows them to be modest, (although counsel admit that here they 
might finally have become factually argumentative,) so that the 
trial court's reduction of the fees should be reversed, with 
fees either approved prima facie, or remanded for hearing as to 
their full, reasonable amount. 
CONCLUSION 
Perkins pray that as a matter of law they be held to 
have priority over Interlake based on either Phase I or II or 
both, and that their damages be the unpaid balance due them on 
their trust deed note with interest or, that failing, 
$17,606.00, which is the difference between the property's value 
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at the time of fraud in December, 1981, and the lien on the 
property of Interlake at that time. 
Perkins pray the issue of punitive damages be remanded 
for trial as to amount. 
Perkins pray they be awarded full attorney fees for 
Phase II of $10,115.75, or that these fees be remanded for 
determination and award, of their full, reasonable amount. 
Perkins pray their costs and, for Phase II their fees, 
for this appeal, and for such other relief as may be proper. 
DATED August 23, 1985. 
SAMUEL KIN 
C£RIC P. HARTMAN 
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notified the court of their intention not to appear or to defend 
this action at trial and were not present, but a party; Southern 
Title Guaranty Company, Inc., now known as Fidelity National Title 
Insurance Company, Inc., was represented by and through its 
attorney Brant H. Wall; Mark J. Williams was represented by and 
through his attorneys Lon Rodney Kump and Lisa K. Olsen. The 
court heard the testimony and was in session for three and one-
half days and heard the respective witnesses called by the parties 
received and reviewed numerous pretrial memoranda and briefs, 
and having been fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiffs, George S. Perkins and Lillie Perkinst 
husband and wife, were the vested owners of certain real property 
located at 54 South Jeremy Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, for approximately twenty-two (22) years. 
In June, 1980, they determined to sell their residence and listed 
their residence with a real estate agent, Peter R. Lucero. 
2. In September, 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Perkins determined 
to sell their home to Coombs Investment Corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as "CIC"), CIC's real estate agent, Paul Scott, on 
September 18, 1980, brought to the Perkins, at their home, an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and presented it to 
the Perkins for their signature. 
3. At that meeting the real estate agent, Paul Scott, 
advised the plaintiffs in detail as to their second position 
should the sale be consummated and that they would be required to 
subordinate their primary interest in their residence located at 
54 South Jeremy Street. On September 23, 1980, the Perkins made 
a counter-offer to CIC which was fully signed by all parties on 
September 25, 1980, which did not alter the terms or conditions 
of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase other than 
modifying the closing date. On October 29, 1980, CIC entered 
-3-
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8. This transaction is similar to the leading case 
in this area in the State of Utah, Kemp v. Zions First National 
Bank, 470 P2d 390 (Utah 1970), where Zions Bank was in the same 
position as Interlake Thrift; Kemp is in the same position as 
Mr. and Mrs. Perkins and CIC is in the same position as the Nobles 
9. The court finds that there was one continuous 
transaction at the closing of October 31, 1980, using one agent 
which was the escrow officer and closing agent, Mark J. Williams, 
making this a purchase money mortgage situation. 
10. Mr. and Mrs. Perkins would be in a first position 
on the property but for the Subordination Agreement which was 
incorporated into the Earnest Money Agreement of September 25, 
1980. There, the Perkins agreed that CIC would obtain a loan from 
the lender. 
11. Mr. and Mrs. Perkins did agree to take a second 
position and subordinate their interest to the lender that CIC 
obtained. In this case that lender was Interlake Thrift. The 
Earnest Money Agreement of September 25, 1980, clearly spelled 
out the intent that the Perkins knew that they were going to 
subordinate their interest as CIC would obtain a lender for the 
purchase. Paul Scott on September 18, 1980, informed the Perkins 
in a detailed presentation that they would be in a second position 
then on the closing on October 31, the closing officer, Mark J. 
Williams made available deeds and trust deeds and other documents 
which would indicate that Interlake Thrift would be in a first 
position. 
12. The loan actually obtained by CIC from Interlake, 
$20,756.44 at the effective interest rate of 24% is not "approxi-
mately* a loan of $17,000 at 14% interest (authorization of the 
Earnest Money Agreement). However, Perkins and their agent 
attended the closing and failed to attempt to ascertain what was 
ultimately going to be put on the property by way of a trust deed 
and trust deed note, so they waived any objection to the difference 
in terms. 
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17. Interlake Thrift has a first position by virtue 
of their Trust Deed of October 29, 1980, and the Perkins have 
a second position by virtue of their Trust Deed of October 31, 
1980, which were recorded with Interlake Thrift's being recorded 
first and Mr. and Mrs* Perkins1 being recorded second. 
18. The Warranty Deed of October 31, 1980, from Mr. 
and Mrs. Perkins to CIC merged the Earnest Money Agreement of 
September 25, 1980, and any differences in the terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement as to the terms surrounding the Warranty 
Deed and the subordination by CIC to Interlake Thrift were merged 
and no differences by virtue of the Earnest Money Agreement of 
September 25, 1980, can exist or be asserted now. 
19. The cause of action against Mark J. Williams as 
a third-party defendant by third-party plaintiff, Interlake Thrift, 
is hereby dismissed, as he was their disclosed agent. This cause 
of action is dismissed on the basis of agency law wherein Mark J. 
Williams was operating within his capacity as an agent and any 
liability would be passed on to his employer, Guaranty Title 
Company, Inc. 
20. Interlake Thrift shall have a judgment against 
Guaranty Title Company by default and their failure to defend 
this action, for damages to be determined at the second trial. 
21. Dick E. Coombs and Ruth R. Coombs' actions are 
stayed by the filing of their bankruptcy in the State of Nevada. 
22. All remaining issues between the parties including 
the third-party claims by Interlake Thrift against Southern 
Guaranty Title Company and all matters surrounding the transaction 
of November 27, 1981, are reserved for trial on January 10, 1984. 
23. In making its Findings of Fact, the court has not 
placed reliance on, nor taken into account, the depositions of 
Mr. Coombs. 
Having made the Findings of Fact the court now makes 
the following: 
-
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fallen t ."> satisfy the requ irements of roe S^atjte :\z Frauds is 
without men:"" due to "~h^  Poe^r^e ~-f Merger. Tue Fame-' '••t-r.-
Agreement and related documents ar-:- fenced i: t: ti>- >n."Tt/ 7e-_ 
Interlake Tnrift'^ e*-' '"x-^ d of Octane'- _ *. .e'K, 
nas priority oven the Perkins' Tn.^i: Jeec ;•: v~*-:- r--> """' ; ?8C 
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and is a valid first security interest and the Trust Deed of 
October 29, 1980, recorded as Entry No. 3497141, Book 5172, 
Page 720, is, in fact, in a first position and has priority over 
any subsequent recording by Mr, and Mrs. Perkins or any others. 
5. The third-party Complaint against the third-party 
defendant, Mark J. Williams, is dismissed as Mr. Williams is a 
disclosed agent and was acting within the scope of his authority, 
6. Interlake Thrift shall have a judgment against 
Guaranty Title Company, Inc., for any damages as are sustained 
by Interlake Thrift on the basis of Guaranty Title Company, Inc., 
default, as shall be determined at the second trial. 
7. Interlake Thrift has judgment against CIC for 
damages such as shall be determined in the second trial on 
January 10, 1984. All causes of action against Dick E. Coombs 
and Ruth R. Coombs are stayed by their bankruptcy filed in the 
State of Nevada. All parties with claims against CIC have judg-
ments against it. 
8. All remaining issues claimed by the plaintiffs 
against defendant, Interlake Thrift, shall be reserved for the 
second trial to be held on January 10, 1984, as to the subor-
dination and rewrite of the second transaction of November 27, 
1981, and all issues as relate to Interlake Thrift's claim 
against Southern Guaranty Title Company with the tender of the 
defense and damages incurred. In addition thereto the issues as 
to damages on Interlake Thrift's judgment against Guaranty Title 
Company, Inc., and Coombs Investment Corporation shall also be 
determined. ^~\ 
DATED this //-*" day of ]J^46ti^^^ , 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
HT.P.R C R: FTSHLER 
District Court Judg^jccT 
*iXQN HINDLEY 
CLERK 
((. CY)okrn<xh 
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This i3 tv. certify that a true aim ^^L'rec: ~opy -: :;ae 
foregoing was rmiled to the oarties of interest listed below, 
r - * ^ ' . ,~1T.-. prepaid/" ^Tttr^ *£ *f "??.-*. 
i U i i. 1 ,:..• .; . i. VJ-JI . «. 
Attorney :or defendant 
Interlake Thrift 
311 South State, Juice 440 
Sa^t Lake Cicy, UT 84111 
c/o D:J.. ^  Coombs. President 
4 522 Buena Vista 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
•V111 i ar:. 1' . Ho 1 yo a k 
Attorney for rhiri .-J- • 
Defendant Lucero 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
I : - 1 1.1K.6 CltlV, 7 r -*- * * * 
!-•• McDow*-"! ? 
Attorney for rhird .~~~ .^  
Defendants Dick & Ruth Cooiubs 
50 West Broadway, Suite ' ') 
Salt Lake Citv.~r^ -' ' n 
Dennis R, Jame^ 
Attorney for Thiru • ncy 
Defendant Guarantee Title 
1800 So, West Tempie, 431C 
Salt Lake Cir.y . ' " 
Lon Rodney Kurap £ Lisa * ^Is^n 
Attorney for Mark Wili^ar-s 
333 East 400 So., *200 
3ranr h. Wall 
AT:romey for; Security 
Title and Souther^ Ti * 
50 0 Judge 3lag. 
Salt Lake C Lr ; , LT b4 . 
Dick E. Coombs 6 HuUi 'Innmb 
4522 Buena Vista 
Las Vegas, Nevada 39102 
/ 
- ^ C ^ ^ 
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ERIC ?. HARTMAN , No. 1400 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1195 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34106 
(801) 486-3751 
FH.S0 ii) -JLZ^.'S {•??££ 
Suit Lak£ Cuy. uah 
NOV 1.9 193 d 
1 Doi>jty C!er'< 
H O.xr/." 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE S. PERKINS and LILLIE 
PERKINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DICK COOMoS, an individual, 
COOMBS INVESTMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation^ INTERLAKE 
THRIFT, a Utah corporation, and 
JOHN DOE FIDELITY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
DICK COOMBS, COOMBS INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, and JOHN DOE 
FIDELITY COMPANY, 
Defendants and 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
PETER ROBERT LUCERO 
Third Party 
Defendant 
INTERLAKE THRIFT, a Utah 
corporation, 
Cross-Claimant 
v. 
DICK E. COOMBS, 
Cross-Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 82-6009 
A*1 
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INTERLAKE THRi !•"!.', i "i m ) 
corporation
 P 
_.d Farcy ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. ) 
GUARANTY TITLE C . a Utah , 
corporation; SOOTERN TITLE ' 
GUARANTY COMPANY, INC., aka 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, INC.; MARK J. 
WILLIAMS, an individual; and 
RUTH R- COOMBS, an individual 
Third Parr,^  
Defendants. ) 
:.n: . _: . - trial of 'pe ahcve-en:u>'i matter came 
on regularLV f^ " ' ^ rir,; . Mrnjar t.-d 12, , —o. before 
the Hor.ordc : e ?.-L\\r. r;' =• . m e> . Judge of the above entitled 
court: rifi-'.e ; ' »c- • v i * i. :o1,-:e'mec "he pruri'r^ >£ the 
vanou.- pdf :es • to: - notion *c nd* head been -he Derkms' 
home .:. r<- ;>o j'1' e^r^ 'iv Street, 5a t ta^e ti*" ".he court" 
havinc found that, aithcugh th^ Pe^ir.s s^r^ \ - advised of the 
^rjis :>: the L-or. between -O'^ ITID -; a .-I In terlake
 t Perkins waived 
their . rioniy : •-> to~ n, >.^  .-., f
 i: ; *-|g to inquire as to the? 
terms :f the Inner Lake-Coombs . ".ar it the closing October Z1 , 
1980. "I.ire I. J:: the trial concealed the Perkins* claim that 
Inter lake *- '••• " nacl induced P-°r>-;ns by fraudulent mi, srepre-
sentat ions to subordinate their i. cerest in the home to ~J 
rewrice of the Interl-ike-Coombs I-'^ n. Phase II also concerned 
the c L aims of In ter 1 ake acjamsr tr•.« issurers «"i f: i t s t i r I e 
insurance : ;r fees, costs and ide^nification 
Tne pi - . nt if f s were pres«-nc and represented by their 
counsel.. Samue; K ir;o and :rric .-fartman; defendant Interiake 
Thriv was representee -o i-s counsel » Mollis Hunt; defendant 
Dick £. 2oombi, ar.c trird part\ defendant Ruth R. Coombs, indi-
viduals, had previously * i 1 ed r ;v bankruptcy and t lie actions 
- - ~r ~sz unefu »*cro stayed, defender" t Coombs Investment Corpora t: i-
ADDENDUM. 
did not appear, having been previously defaulted; third party 
defendant Guaranty Title Company did not appear, having been 
previously defaulted; third party defendants Southern Title 
Company, Inc« and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, 
Inc. were represented by their counsel, Brant H. Wall. 
The court heard the testimony of witnesses called by 
the parties, received numerous exhibits over the course of 
Phase II of the trial, heard argument and motions, and being 
fully advised in the premises now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In the Fall of 1981, title to the real property 
commonly known as 54 South Jeremy, Salt Lake City, Utah, was 
vested in Coombs Investment Corporation (CIC), subject to a 
first Trust Deed held by defendant Interlake Thrift (Interlake), 
and a second Trust Deed held by plaintiffs George S. Perkins 
and Lillie Perkins (Perkins). 
2. In the Fall of 1981, CIC allowed both Trust Deeds 
to go into default. 
3. CIC and Coombs resolved their difficulties by a 
rewrite of CIC's 1980 loan with Interlake, which also included 
in the total figure a delinquent loan owed Interlake by Dick E. 
Coombs (Coombs) as an individual. The new loan combining both 
the existing loans was for $24., 688 . 70 . The interest rate on 
the new loan was the same as the effective interest rate on the 
old loan. However, the new loan had only one year in which to 
make final payment rather than 10 years, and included in the 
total principal sum the amount of Coombs1 personal loan, 
$2,464.41. Interlake deemed it necessary to obtain a subordin-
ation agreement from Perkins agreeing that they would be sub-
ordinate to this new consoliated loan. Coombs and CIC at all 
times dealt with Ronald Adams, Manager of the Interlake Branch 
that dealt with them. Adams had a subordination agreement 
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prevailed for signature by the Perkins and delivered It to 
Coombs z-:>r execution by the Perk-.'-:-;. •" n presentation of the 
subordination agreement, the Ferv.ir • refused - : si;;-
Trie Perkins retiainei :"- Robert Knight. a.u attorney, 
to recorer tne cayments ui- z. *-•:- tr in uy\, 
«ni ;r ' cor. trio red Adorns ~>r . IDO-J December ^ , 193 1 
arid discussed t; - subord m a t 1 on agreement witn n;m. 
•' . Adams, acting . n r; s ''iDarL^y as trar.c* manager 
of Interlace, .ndicacen *~o <n:ghr- t .at v.o subordination rjree-
ment was necessar*. *-. J '. i ir terla^e foreclosing zr a *• us 
i *: * ad ^ ^ j r ^ ; .in*- tu * :)^^kms. 'darns advised Kn:.jht ^nat 
che new .. aar oeu^-p "* -.: : ,:-^  sr! *<e - ^ a on;*- an extension of 
the exiting , :-u , ,»,c.X'j.' C I. '"- *. \ u r ^  i .a * the 
first 1 .an an-"* • < * - *-^ --^ -j -, > - - emu-
lated : --ere--
\ J J . _, i . ;«. -(• o> ..w A'l.u u. % i r •" s e r i *" -• 
i i i % • , -u Adan^ a g r e e d and w r o t e Kn . jn*" a l e t t e r -dated 
Decemb*-4 - " f l l a u ^ r i u , n *i- n /<h; ' • ' / ; ' J i ^ c e r ^ ' j i* - v i d e n c e . 
Based ~ -d.iins v-*- .•>* . r-j; --"S^ n^ a " ; orto J:M n:s 
letter ->n;?r* oe::evei ^n^r ]n" jr' -K-- -/ ^ .'.1 u^rar^- s*~are 
the "rewrite terms" witn C ':. '*:,:•; *~ ^eas^nacl/ tssum^d an d 
believed that the r*er\Kina wer--- in : ior subordinate ": Writer _ a*<e 
with renar<-i *"< ori.or.tv an' * aa*~ :' thev i:i ^ ^ - iv . *-" 
subordination agreemeer1" . ' ~ev ^ou. : i ;ae anetr nor- . 
further reasonably assumed ar<< • ^  •-< T4*- -.^ *^ r*ms .; '*e 
1981 loan *pre consistent '.a-.'i ' n^ '-arms of the i'a^< l^"~rLaKe-~ 
CIC loan except for inclusion of late charges and accumulated 
interest. The court finds as fact that this reliance was 
reasonable under the circumstances. Based on that reliance» 
Knight advised his clients, the Perkins, to sign the subordina-
tion agreement, which they did on December 31 ,  1981, the 
Perkins reasonably relying on the advice of their attorney. 
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9. Interlake had closed Coombs' personal loan and 
included it into the CIC loan before Adams made his verbal 
and written representations to Knight. 
10. The court finds there is clear and convincing 
evidence of all the elements of fraud: 
a. Representations were made both by telephone 
conversation and letter that the rewrite of the CIC loan, and 
the subordination agreement the Perkins were to sign, covered 
only the amount including interest and late charges CIC owed 
Interlake on the 1980 Trust Deed Note secured by the Perkins1 
home. 
bo These representations concern presently 
existing material facts. 
c. The representations were false (1) because 
they ommitted that Interlake had included Coombs' personal 
loan of $2,464.. 41 which is not only a personal loan but had 
not been previously secured by the property of the Perkins; 
and (2) the term of the new loan shortened from 10 years to 
one year the amount of time in which CIC had to pay. All these 
misrepresentations were material. 
d. Ronald Adams, having taken entire charge of 
the matter on behalf of Interlake in negotiations with CIC, 
Coombs, the Perkins, and the Perkins' attorneys, knew or should 
have known the representations to be false or he made them 
recklessly without sufficient knowledge upon which to have 
based such representations. This is apparent from the facts 
that: (1) Interlake, one month prior to the time Adams spoke 
to Knight, had closed Coombs' personal loan as fully paid, and 
(2) had rewritten and had executed the new CIC loan from 
Interlake secured by the Perkins' property with final figures 
including Coombs' personal loan, and the shortened time for 
payment. 
e. Adams did so for the purpose of inducing 
Knight to act upon his representations and to have the Perkins 
sign the subordination agreement. 
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f T1oighh, m d "ho +~um the ,; .- - :-. * .^ i 
reasonably :'* r^ i"i:*n^ e on toe repr-'";en':ati . r.s f r ~ '"" -.-<r 
made through it.-. Manager, .-darns. 
c. , .\.oiqr* aoo trie ^er^ino did . :. 
Adams' misrepresentations. 
} he Perkins we*"e : hereby induced to ^c1" ^ v 
signing m e sub- •• u • n it or; lgreerren- . 
:he Perkins -were carnage: "-- ' ' h" the equity 
in theii •*  "•" - -*JH reduced ' y S. 
he Perkins' damages er^ -he amount of the persona 
] ,ai: of 31 , ^ 6** .-•« "• , merged ntu m e '9*: I - ;aa which, r. 
inheres" fr_ir. m o Jate or ^ecoroat: :>n or ->? subordmati .n 
agreement, Jan-.r^v -" . - — ..icu m e date or , a. - v Lnterlake 
"inft 10 trust -seed m m o December , * , interest i^crue 
a" ** ~^ 'eqa: "^ne or . o -uereafter. 
":>. P^m^o:- f a i l e d t m i t i g a t e t h e i r i jmaqes , i n 
*--a.--. -.i-y c . ^ m ; nave dor,*- ot o* to'id no* :n a f t e r tro s eco rd 
d e f a u l t and redeerr m g m^-i p r o p e r v, >r:ich would ^ave ^ m i l t e d 
" t e i r i m a g e s m m e tniour,: of *oo~ns :>~rsonal 1 
I "* " L " "-* r ^ m ?r---J . : t * awarded 3 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 a s 
r e a s o n a b l y ; r o , :;ey r ^ b r o r Phase : I . 
:.•« . t . ^ ' O v o damages she* La ,. . m e d a s t h e 
above r e l i e f t o trie F- - . : ^ :. s i d e g u a t e 
1 5 . :~-'" roo -~ , a r e -:n—rma ~*osts •. . - l o r 
Phase T T. 
1 6 . N o d e c _... i . i . . . - ; *-: .-. -i . . . . . . . . 
~ *- a g a i n s t Dick F rv-.nhs ,r P . * ' : "oomns. a s m e s e p r o c e e d i n g 
have been s t a y e d as - * -• i- oy * o -"- * - no -? Pet.**: on m 3ar;.-; 
r u p t c m However, pur^u--.";" ^ - . ' ' m - Pu" — . ' ^ * 
P r o c e d u r e , t h e Cour t ou - ^ e t e r m n t o m a t m e r e . -: 
reason f o r d^lav and d i r e * t s t h e e n t r y of a f i n a l , i d ^ e s 3 =, 
to tror :*i aims be tween i, i a , :i r . : : s -n i 1: m ^ I a k c m r r u r p o s e s 
immedia te a p p e a l , :— • > . - to Phase I and 11 of t h i s t r i a l . 
ADDENDUM ~^ ^-aae 6 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That defendant Interlake Thrift committed fraud 
upon the plaintiffs, George S* Perkins and Lillie Perkins, 
through misrepresentations of Interlkae's branch manager, 
Ronald Adams. 
2. That plaintiffs were damaged in the amount of 
$2,464.41 at 24% interest from January 6, 1982, through December 
1982, and at the legal rate of 10% thereafter. 
3. That plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney 
fees of $2,500. 
4o That plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages 
by not redeeming the Jereby Street property after the second 
default, such that their damage award should be limited to the 
above amounts. 
5. Tha£~plaintiffs are entitled to costs. 
DATED ' rltr^^^X /C, , 1984. ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
BY THE COURT: CLERK 
By K fimQ$(\h? 
deputy Clerk 
FISHLER, JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, to Hollis Hunt, attorney for Interlake 
Thrift, 311 South State, No. 440, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, 
U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, , 1984. 
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Th is may be a leejalfy b i n d i n g f o r m ii n o i uncjpistoo J f.fek of t ie i K I J M P 
REALTOR 
.,, TO: ERA NEW WORLD REALTY Lake City 
i N C Of * '"» i O E W A T I O N O f i o i • -qt nit "Tmnl | u u t < y Quf f f ir J + , . u . 
f j o s ' i i . . ' i y o u *' f • * '""» « % I i"*"* o "i" e v l»"»• * « "" n • »I ( i JL V U . • J J U , 
- • - Company,.check , 
...•«.,-•*...,.•.. - COOMBS INVESTMENT CORPORAI'ION 
0;:e Hundred••_--" — . - - - - - . . - „ - , - , . . , , , . 
I rt <#tw'<* **»d *OCKy 0»« IR* 0*#*CM*t« 0* lift* (KOP** |y ' I t t u l l t C t »ll' . 54 South Jeremy MLS »23996 
o Sa l t Lake t„ .S.alt_Lake_ Cou«ly. Si»i* o« JJ t 3 f t 
I . « M U O * « < | »«y of ir»# fo«©#»*«*9 n#nt% il j t o#«t«M i t u c N O l o tno premtte*: Pfumoirt? tm» ne«onf IU«wr»* #nd equipment including tioiter « « a o i * !•**«•%, w * i e * M * t « t t . i A 4 t M M « l > t ' « 
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i e -c^o . _ J i Q a e . _ „ .. . _ „ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . 
4 i»mn»,io««»fCNHHK'*»ixootfiytr»#n**%(>&f.n«iuaeaJ%0Jft„im.,o«op«riyou#en*t«d: P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y as pe r l i s t i n g agreement. 
• i ScHcx«.LQ- Warrant, . that . a l l , h e a t i n g , plumbing, e l e c t r i c a l and appl iances to he i.ygnod 
• u :wQXking_ord e r _ a t _ t ime_of _c 1 os.e_Qr_ oiay_pjurcha.se.apglJj^Jj^JiRA Buyer P r o t e c t i o n P13 n 
,i «•«*tot*.
 w^»co*««»*»i,.,i.7*.QD.Q*.00. * yThirty^se..¥,cn tM.us..and ~,- • — , , , , ool , 
I s ii -it (:>«• 94*JDie .in. ikitiowii, 
, , » - 0 - •»*HTtl M l l f * 490*0*t% \**9, %• 
*»"•<« r*or«t«i t t t the 4»or»d«»CMO«C oeoot l t , iet.«ipi at -»nicn <i n tMOv *fc-.rtowt«aq»a Cry y o u : 
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?(. 5 3/_50_. _ Payment s h a l l be made 
..
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O U « IV ( M < <J M • # |: O A 11 • .111. » H 11" 1" O i»* t €»« 0> * t)" 
i o v«*o«l tUt«m«n| -
E R A NEW WORLD _ R E A L T Y „ _ . . . . &J> A*Kt»t By .L^/Tf lUyV„ ,,,U 1 5t:^aJX-
ALDENL'-M " ~>RM 
w. an «*..cr>v s*tt «» c m y out J « « ta»Mi tn« texrn ^n* cono.i.,.rt» v M o i i f ^ o c . ^ . *««d !•»• i«»e* *<»»eet «© fu»r>.»n ^oud *no mtrkct io i t m»«j «,.in * a X t X X I £ X X ^ \ X 2 - X X X X & 
XXXX<-»«<* «•» i.«,... ..*.„,..<-..»•!,« .•„.»« „# ,„* „u„ nJW .ma „. ,...*. «,„«» o^,-*., .^ ** W«M««.U dwtf XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)(^^XiXXXXyjCjC^j^,X^y_>L-
... f.< C.«M| o« %.»»« «»• .%«*<• ?»*.••» .*.« , » . n » # i v . >*«•» ~.»t ot.>..«>•> <»«.d*r,<* «» t .»e </» ...,».i m ««« „, „,*«. ,r <„n«, 0 ^ . i y <t>n so 10 do. n« „»•** to o , * *»« r . ^ . ^ i J V n . *, . .« , I m i _ 
M - . . J ..4 .,» 4,i« I H | W *'.>.-«s •»•« •»• i*S- 3» /^»C'» |l»*T»»». . . . c i„ { j . . , v _ .rj». ,«jt>ic jn»»«.»rr» ice. 
»»«• wtv a.|»vr> ».• *.#...•«!*•• .it...•. .il »n«* r«N.«tv «•» iiiv .*<>«•.» t ••• t»<>Ci»'"*n a u»*» «">».*»<?'. 10 pay i*»d *9«»»t » CO>nm*\y<on of 5> 1 X p g T ° C ! f > n f * ( fi :. ) -
<.. »t... ,-•*•*• %«»•*« MJ\ fct.|-». a •«»«.» .» ««%«M»«J c i»M'*\t Mitn an* o t n c t *o«m mtf **.o t.uu»*t,i .% preterm? r«iect>«€. t»»»* c^'tqr^on «*.u o« a* « o »o»c« o* «<*«ct. 
JfsJLIexS-jLfndersiajid thajLJupoa^closing^Ts.ellers .wi 11..convey all of their right titJLe-iuuL. 
interest*in and to the purchase property to the Buyer except the second trusl deed. This 
^^JL^LJuS 4ubl.ec,t. ..to the_^JJxty_o£_tJie<;.buyer..tQ,..obtain commitment for a__Ioan gof jipproximat 
$17,000"4Oo at interest of 14% per annum* secured by a first trust deed on the'purchase pre 
to provide funds for the down payment and refurbishment of the purchased property. This 
sale subject to a complete inspection and approval by the buyer within (15) fifteen days. 
Buyer reserves the right to substitute collateral for second trust deed note from time 
to time. Buyer will maintain sellers equity position in like or better investment quaiit 
property. Like collateral property must meet or exceed requirements of IRS Code Section 
1031 covering like kind exchanges. Mr* Coombs is a licensed Realtor and part owner of 
Coombs Investment Corporation, £&~i'>*^>s JL^^^y^*^/— d-t^p 
^ act. i J****- A 
•>ate Seller Date Purchaser 
>ate Seller Date Purchaser 
i° »-»«© • «t)vM'«t o«o*e«t i o 5^t ••!%»• <r«»u<c\ « i tr»»% o»nirj<i x>ttot>^<%.»»» u k | n « t i " n lu o>tvr> *»»d «>•»••*. 0«0«'>a«nt n o o n I no metA«<i w n d . 9m o> m « i o » i > * i « | »<»<",*» "*»*>»! »# ir»«4»i«i«s ) 
R E C E I P T 
It tl<)l»4lv»»«t: A 
HL22ISL! &/?* ^ <*"'W •?'~~^' t<yt^ ' _ 
fir ^ 
• M J B H » W ^ ^ . . f t . ^ ^ ^ ~ 3 ^ S S ? 
ADDENDUM I I I , BOTTOM OF FORM 
Dated: 4ySt^5Time: 
In response to the offer to purchase the real property commonly known as . . . . . ^ . . . ^ ^ ^ . . . . j ^ f ^ _ . . . -
JAu6^... .WW ...- . -
made by .. .Coc^vx3i.. . .XA4v€-6r-^ tve-^^ ^£Po*A-T<<fcA/ t 
dated .....^./.pv/.tfO- - • t h e following counter offer is hereby submitted: 
.^AT--C---Or-....<-4-G3£-" -F-te*^ • 
HI I U 11 
OTHER TERMS: All other terms to remain the same. 
RIGHT TO ACCEPT OTHER OFFERS: Seller reserves the right to accept any other offer prior to purchaser's 
written ?£ceptance of this counter offer. Acceptance shall not be effective until personally received "by ^ " " -
(Listing Agent) 
EXPIRATION: This counter offer shall expire unless a copy hereof with purchaser's written acceptance is 
delivered to seller or his agent within 1> day^from date. 
/ / 
.ArSU. Seller 
Seller 
Dated: Time: 
The undersigned purchaser accepts the above counter offer. 
ADDENDUM I I I , COUNTEROFFE. 
i t «•;•! • • * • » ; ^ t ( | . « . | u » * » i r 
iQgLAKE TOSffgL.: 
•01 • - v V U ^ O * * N u l l >'.3 D-bClO* t l b l A U ' / . l u l O LOAN 
» i »*-£j»»cd Oy Pedum and S u i t i»w. *.u««i» ei««-»oi 
v..-
.A..—»-"» 
C O » 0 S * f * V l * ? l i C H T tNC 
I 4 » ^ U T H I I 0 0 CAST 
m?iiL—ftiiiu**, 
,00 
. ftHlHCl 
•a*U?}>£j, 
ptRCtwnctwm 
i 7 i - j i Q _ n 
£291-80, 
C<»oc>io*ii<>pers0f^1 c ^ y , ^ ^ ^ m e k ^ i i n d Ryth CoorobS 
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0 * » » ••••OO* 
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b» » * > 0 • • s A r « t m « . »wbl«Cl ! » • « M » I « W « f t M * n c * C N » O O * ©* S 7 . S 0 v h e ' t A m o w M ? •««<>« •« « m v c t M i t S 7 S . 0 O . o » o #»«#»»mWrt» P ^ o « « e C n e r Q e o* S b . 0 0 
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ooi«Cfttjdc. t o camftk»m«x t o e n e 
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.CCU«<»T: Q Tft^* t o * n • v^««cc^c«>0 
e*CM««0 b y i r»* S * x u * « y 
•«>« o*a«r>»«>0 /! WO* v * A < c ! « ( e t 
1 • !>«- * M*A4 •OOr rr^f •-ootu-a M*««iM> M3 enj 
t o t > « n * i «•!•» « 0 I M O »ou«o«o»«m of o « * # r ^ * * * ^ * * » w °<* * " * * • * * o * n o o « o oe w f u c b m»? b o *v*«4Mift»r e m i c ^ o t f . «»*^ • * tmomctmmM* m * o * b y • » * • D«>o»o» o r 
•*>T o f n « • * • « « » e ^ b « « i l»v« I f fo o t I A * «oCwff«» « p * * * « n o « i f L 
J | AA ( o n t M M t f o o o o s n o w o w w r f b r t n o O o b c o r * A 4 h o o t o r v * o « f 1» o» ftbovf ( N o D*b*o»*» p f * c * of to*»o«ACO. m t>c&w*»4 v / H b m 1 0 a * r © » o » * e f » o f . o ^ 
CJxOiWf b«A AOt lM*Nl*«3 ••) ! » » • H o m o »fO»Ofl H * » * : 
ADDENDUM I V , TOP OF FORM 
frf, j T m t o * * m •«c«*»6 Or • Mo«o*0« O* 0 « * 0 Of Trw«» on r • * ! • • ! • ! • c o m m o n * •0©»«%««0 *• J L , S 0 > 
INSURANCE NOTICE 
.J&reay. SIX. Utah., 
CAIDH l#E AttOlOA OlSA8*,fTY JNSUAANC* IS MOT AEOUWEO K OAO€A 
TO OeTAM T H S 10AM *» clurot * oudt tor citot tatmince «wr 1« »nr 
o*o**6t« **tu 0**v(%l sioyii tftt »ppiop«ait auitmtnt btio». For U>o 
t t f « /rf w ^ w Jt* CM! wiM bt. kJT 
(a) S*»g* OvctcJVM^Ttffolil* taurincA t , .. . 
(&)Jo*itOtcfUMit lcimlrt* kmuowa * ' S 
<c)__4*r Mvoxuv* 0«**b**j btufwct t 
*» taurine* • « bo sbotMtf f OtMar fe ifc0 6& * datt htf oof. 
1*ev*e S*ofc Dto upnf Tom U t fooniico only. 
Q*t _ _ S'*«*t4 .Debtor 
w» ««i»« joint Ovo««w*g t««ft Mf (ftsuanct onlf. 
Q*» &«o*o< • 
0*«1- .S lQfWN) . . 
I ocv«« $*»•*» 0«o«4MAf Tern lift **4 OtuMify faituanct. 
Oa#t _ S*or«« _ _ _ _ 
. Otbtof 
.SpOVtl 
. OfMar 
* r «twt Jo)Mt Orc/us** Turn tiff »*4 OiuMitr tosurvtct, 
won. J a * OtuMMy WuMTMCt * NOT provided. Covtfsot a taended to 
Ocwar m*f. 
0*e_ . Siooed.. 
.Siomtf. 
l/wt 00 HOT »»m Oto* Ue or DiubMitr km*MCA. 
OBK 
. OtMor 
. Spovtf 
. Oebtoi 
. Spoust 
Ot fT0A|S) HAT OtTAJK AfOWAED **0*tftTY IWSUAANCX THAOUGM ANY 
A6UT C* mSCHOCE WHOS i a * $ £ 0 1000 BUSINESS M THS STATE 
HOUS£*OIO con TENTS INSUAANCE — i oMwctf ttvo*oA if* u*0«r t*e 
CO«J i « »
—
_ *OM*ft • * bt t * Awaurt of Cownof * 
CAwatuno* FAMUCL Debtors our. «"«** »5 **r* »*» » * « * * * • * 
of. a*cet at bu» *ai p»n of U» W»»u»nxt trut he/t*e »*ected to t.refute 
M * »«••*« • tw* !•<<** of tt>« pMtuwwi. AA pof<kt m ( i r w a i i t of 
« H » V < » M«rU KCW»»AAf 3 «M«t«* f «Ou«»l for CJ*Ct**UB«t. 
Coomb* Tnv**tm«»nt 
DISBURSEMENT Of AMOUNT FINANCED 
MCT AMOUNT 0U€ ON PACSENT LOAir 
Chtctto In ter img Thrift and 
O«cfcto_ 
Q*ckto_ 
0««cttb. 
Oxctfo. 
CMckio. 
Check to . 
pMiArantftr T l t l r Co 
fWk i.Con^H^ Tnv^^tn^nt Ar tMck ?. A 
deck to oeb>»Rut.h..Cofflnba & Guarantcg T l t l g . 
PAOatOS AVAAAAtE 10 OCBTOA 
Howwtioid comertts bo prinanno co»taoc t . 
CrtW INo t DiubiMy ^*«" 
Adtfrtiofut OvAton: 
OtickjJftrt 
0»Mr (LipU-%) • 
A/no*** f tfUACtd 
FINANCE CHARCE 
Tou* of f>r«tntt 
- 3 4 5 1 A A G L 
J&SEL 
1 7 , ^ ] ^ 
2SLHAJA 
JLLSQ 
2Q,75&.H 
a*, ij-i.rt 
U..88Q.CO 
NOTICE; ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CON-
TRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH 
THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF 
GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE PROCEEDS 
HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE OEBTOR SHALL 
NOT EXCEEO AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER, 
i r*«0*>iSSO«r MOTC ANO OiSClOlu*C STATCMCMI O * COAW ••»•«»«•« »?•»• 'COCAA4. 
EXHIBIT C 
ADDENDUM I V , BOTTOM OF FO: 
100 INTERLAKE BUILDING 7025 EAST 2100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84106 PHONE 487-0653 
October 30, 1980 
Guarantee Title Company 
4525 South 2300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411? 
RoEs Coombs Investment Corporations 
Committment No- C-1730 
Dear Mark, 
Enclosed is our Trust Deed and our checks in the 
following amounts. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
7.00 
62.00 
19,350.76 
Recording Fee 
Title Policy Premium 
See Below 
Check Number 3 J 
Proceeds are to be disbursed by Guarantee Title* 
1. Pay to Coombs Investment all remaining monies when 
Interlake Thrift is in a first mortgage position on this 
property wested under Coombs Investment Cop. with no other 
tax liens or any other liens ahead of Interlake. Thrift. 
Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
Ronald D. Adams 
Branch Manager 
I agree to the term and conditions set forth in this 
letter and acknowledge receipt of a copy here of. 
/1
"J^/A t /? ,^ V^^ C- , ; ^  
Dick E. Coombs, President 
ADDENDUM V. 
INTERLAKE WsM 
100 INTERLAKE BUILDING 102S EAST 2100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 94106 P H Q N E 437 06S3 
December 30, 1981 
George S. Perkins 
Lillie Perkins 
Bob Knight, Attorney at Law 
R.E.: Property Located at 54 South Jeremy Street 
On November 27, 1981, Interlake Thrift agreed to rewrite the loan of 
Coombs Investment Corporation. This rewrite was done to avoid forclosure 
proceedings. 
The subordination agreement from Mr. and Mrs. Perkins is necessary 
to keep Interlake Thrift in a first mortgage position. Also, had the 
subordination agreement not been done, Interlake Thrift would forclose on 
subject property and, to protect their interest Mr. and Mrs. Perkins would 
have to payoff Interlake Thrift. 
The new account with Interlake Thrift will be larger than the original 
loan with interest due, costs and charges. 
Yours., truly, 
Ronald D. Adams 
Branch Manager 
RDA/hd 
ADDENDUM VII 
STATUTES CITED IN BRIEF 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. No estate or 
interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Every 
contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, 
or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. Every conveyance of 
real estate hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as 
provided in this title, shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any portion 
thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly 
recorded. 
70B-3-205. Loan finance charge on refinancing. With 
respect to a consumer loan, refinancing or consolidation, 
che lender may by agreement with the debtor refinance the 
unpaid balance and may contract for and receive a loan 
finance charge based on the principal resulting from the 
refinancing at a rate not exceeding that permitted by the 
provisions on loan finance charge for consumer loans 
(section 70B-3-201) or the provisions on loan finance 
charge for supervised loans (section 70B-3-508), whichever 
is appropriate. For the purpose of determining the loan 
finance charge permitted, the principal resulting from the 
refinancing comprises the following: 
(1) if the transaction was not precomputed, the 
total of the unpaid balance and the accrued 
charges on the date of the refinancing or, if the 
transaction was precomputed, the amount which the 
debtor would have been required to pay upon 
prepayment pursuant to the provisions on rebate 
upon prepayment (section 70B-3-210) on the date of 
ADDENDUM VII, Page 1 
refinancing, except that for the purpose of 
computing this amount no minimum charge (section 
70B-3-210) shall be allowed; and 
(2) appropriate additional charges (section 
70B-3-202), payment of which is deferred. 
70B-3-206. Loan finance charge on consolidation. 
(1) If a debtor owes an unpaid balance to a lender with 
respect to a consumer loan, refinancing, or consolidation, 
and becomes obligated on another consumer loan, 
refinancing, or consolidation with the same lender, the 
parties may agree to a consolidation resulting in a single 
schedule of payments. If the previous consumer loan, 
refinancing, or consolidation was not precomputed, the 
parties may agree to add the unpaid amount of principal and 
accrued charges on the date of consolidation to the 
principal with respect to the subsequent loan. If the 
previous consumer loan, refinancing, or consoldiation was 
precomputed, the parties may agree to refinance the unpaid 
balance pursuant to the provisions on refinancing (section 
70B-3-205) and to consolidate the principal resulting from 
the refinancing by adding it to the principal with respect 
to the subsequent loan. In either case the lender may 
contract for and receive a loan finance charge based on the 
aggregate principal resulting from the consolidation at a 
rate not in excess of that permitted by the provisions on 
loan finance charge for consumer loans (section 70B-3-201) 
or the provisions on loan finance charge for supervised 
loans (section 70B-3-508), whichever is appropriate. 
{2) The parties may agree to consolidate the unpaid balance 
of a consumer credit sale. The parties may agree to 
refinance the previous unpaid balance pursuant to the 
provisions on refinancing sales (section 70B-2-205) or the 
provisions on refinancing loans (section 70B-3-2Q5), 
whichever is appropriate, and to consolidate the amount 
financed resulting from the refinancing or the principal 
resulting from the refinancing by adding it to the amount 
financed or principal with respect to the subsequent sale 
or loan. The aggregate amount resulting from the 
consolidation shall be deemed principal, and the creditor 
may contract for and receive a loan finance charge based on 
the principal at a rate not in excess of that permitted by 
the provisions on loan finance charge for consumer loans 
(section 70B-3-201) or the provisions on loan finance 
charge for supervised loans (section 70B-3-508), whichever 
is appropriate. 
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70B-3-508. Loan finance charge for supervised loans. 
(1) With respect to a supervised loan, including a loan 
pursuant to a revolving loan account, a supervised lender 
may contract for and receive a loan finance charge not 
exceeding that permitted by this section. 
(2) The loan finance charge, calculated according to the 
actuarial method may not exceed the equivalent of the 
greater of either of the following% 
(a) the total of 
(i) 36 per cent per year on the part of the 
unpaid balances of the principal which is $300 or 
less; 
(ii) 21 percent per year on that part of the 
unpaid balances of the principal which is more 
than $300 but does not exceed $1,000; and 
(iii) 15 per cent per year on that part of the 
unpaid balances of the principal which is more 
that $1,000; or 
(b) 18 per cent per year on the unpaid balances of the 
principal. 
(3) This section does not limit or restrict the manner of 
contracting for the loan finance charge, whether by way of 
add-on, discount, or otherwise, so long as the rate of the 
loan finance charge does not exceed that permitted by this 
section. If the loan is precomputed, 
(a) The loan finance charge may be calculated on the 
assumption that all scheduled payments will be made 
when due, and 
(b) the effect of prepayment is governed by the 
provisions on rebate upon prepayment (section 
70B-3-210). 
(4) The term of a loan for the purposes of this section 
commences on the date the loan is made. Differences in the 
lengths of months are disregarded and a day may be counted 
as l/30th of a month. Subject to classifications and 
differentiations the lender may reasonably establish, a 
part of a month in excess of fifteen days may be treated as 
a full month if periods of fifteen days or less are 
disregarded and that procedure is not consistently used to 
obtain a greater yield than would otherwise be permitted. 
(5) Subject to classifications and differentiations the 
lender may reasonably establish, he may make the same loan 
finance charge on all principal amounts within a specified 
range. A loan finance charge so made does not violate 
subsection (2) if 
(a) when applied to the median amount within each 
range, it does not produce a rate of loan finance 
charge exceeding the maximum permitted in subsection 
(2), and 
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(b) when applied to the lowest amount within each 
range, it does not produce a rate of loan finance 
charge exceeding the rate calculated according to 
paragraph (a) by more than 8 per cent of the rate 
calculated according to paragraph (a). 
(6) The amounts of $300 and $1,000 in subsection (2) are 
subject to change pursuant to the provisions on adjustment 
of dollar amounts (section 70B-1-106). 
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